Abstract

This dissertation examines transcendental idealism as a refutation of phenomenalist empiricism. I argue that Kant provides both a knock-down refutation of phenomenalism in all its forms and an antidote against a return to naive realism. The only way that Kant's arguments can work, however, is if they amount to an analysis of the embodiment of consciousness. I show that Kant does implicitly provide such an analysis and that his contribution to the subject-which has largely gone unrecognized---is revolutionary and sophisticated enough to be of lasting interest. ;The first chapter deals with Hume's phenomenalist empiricism. His denial of the essential constituents of objectivity---'body' and 'necessary connection'---not only renders any distinction between self and the world impossible but is also premised upon an account of experience that ultimately founders upon the issue of the unity of consciousness across time. Hume's confession of bewilderment in his Appendix shows that he was aware of, but unable to deal with, this problem. ;Kant's transcendental philosophy, by contrast, is a systematic unfolding of the necessary conditions of self-consciousness as regards the unity of time. The categories of substance, causality and community are part of this unfolding. They constitute the concept of an object in general. But for the arguments of the analogies to work, the body must function as an implicit nexus through which the analogies play themselves out. In my view, then, Kant moves from self-consciousness through objectivity to embodiment. ;The dissertation thus shows that transcendental idealism, far from rendering the world a mere fabrication of the mind, is actually a penetrating analysis of what it means for consciousness to be embodied. Much maligned claims by Kant of nature being subjectively constructed or of space and time being ideal are not outrageously subjectivist; when understood in the proper context they turn out to be not only defensible but indispensable in any discussion of embodiment or the relation of world and self