Akratic feelings

Elsewhere, I have argued for the possibility of strict or full-blown akratic action - roughly, free (or uncompelled), intentional action against the agent's better judgment.' My aim in the present paper is to defend and account for the possibility of an analogous variety of akratic feeling.
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DOI 10.2307/2107960
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Hagit Benbaji (2013). How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):577-599.

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