Abstract

In this dissertation I argue that causal theories of reference cannot succeed, because they depend upon a serious misconception of the relation between thought and action. I begin by describing the kind of theory that I want to criticize, namely causal, naturalistic reductions of reference, theories according to which what makes it the case that a sound token or inscription refers is simply that it bears a special sort of causal relation to some object. Taking Michael Devitt's theory as a paradigm, I argue that such theories will generally have to make use of what I call the "schematic theory of reference", namely the claim that a sound token or inscription refers if its production was caused, perhaps in some special way, by mental states of a certain kind. ;After discussing the connections between reference and intentional action, I describe some examples of sound tokens and inscriptions which are not produced intentionally and do not refer, but do satisfy the causal conditions spelled out in Devitt's theory. Moreover, since the production of the sound tokens and inscriptions in the examples is caused by appropriate mental states, those sound tokens and inscriptions satisfy all of the causal conditions which intuitively seem relevant to reference, unless being produced intentionally is itself a causal condition, or can be causally explicated. Consequently, the examples serve as counterexamples to any causal theory of reference which does not incorporate a successful causal theory of intentional action. In this way, the examples show that the success of causal theories of reference depends on the success of causal theories of action. This dependence revealed, I then argue against causal theories of action, showing that currently available theories are generally vulnerable to some version of a famous example of Donald Davidson's, or have related difficulties. I also explore the notion of guidance, to which many causal theorists of action have appealed, arguing in the end that the only sort of causal guidance available to such theorists will not meet the needs of their theories. ;Because causal theories of action will still retain their appeal as long as no alternative is available, I next develop an account of intentional action and reason explanations in terms of teleology. Rejecting the causal theorists' claim that what makes an item of behavior qualify as an intentional action is that it has a special kind of cause, I claim that what makes an item of behavior qualify as an intentional action is that it has a special kind of purpose, namely what I call a "conscious purpose". Finally, I show how my arguments against causal theories of action actually function as arguments against the causal reduction of conscious purpose, and I argue that the putatively successful causal reduction of biological teleology provides no intuitive support for the project of giving a causal reduction of purpose in action