Is ‘Moral’ A Dirty Word?

Philosophy 47 (181):206 (1972)
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Abstract

The word moral and its derivatives are showing signs of strain. Like a small carpet, designed to fit a room which has been enlarged, they are wrenched this way and that to cover the bare spaces. Perhaps in the end we shall be forced to abandon them altogether, as Nietzsche suggested. But this would be wasteful, and it seems a good idea to examine first the various spaces they can cover, and try to fix them to the one where they are needed most. I shall approach this problem by making very full quotations. It is not an isolated verbal puzzle which can be settled by showing that a particular usage exists; we need to know as well just what it is doing. There are real muddles here, within common-sense, about the relation of thought to life. There is no simple plain-man's usage prepared for us to follow. Anyone who uses moral in anything beyond the Daily Mirror sense is no longer a quite plain man anyway, and we had better follow careful writers than casual ones, real ones than imaginary ones. Philosophers, unlike the Erewhonians, do not have to study a hypothetical language. I am sure both that quotations are necessary and that mine are inadequate; I hope other people will supplement them. As for my choice, I can only say that I have tried very hard not to be tendentious. Certainly I have quoted authors who are capable of being silly and perverse, but as far as I can see the remarks I have taken from them are sober and normal. Anyone may disagree with them, but not, I hope, think them oddly worded. My point affects all the derivatives of moral and to some extent those of ethical too, so I have drawn my illustrations from all of them.

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Author's Profile

Mary Midgley
Last affiliation: Newcastle University, UK

Citations of this work

Anscombe on Brute Facts and Human Affairs.Rachael Wiseman - 2020 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 87:85-99.
Virtuous People and Moral Reasons.Julia Annas - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-12.

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References found in this work

The Sovereignty of Good.Iris Murdoch - 1971 - Philosophy 47 (180):178-180.
Moral arguments.Philippa Foot - 1958 - Mind 67 (268):502-513.
Symposium: “When is a Principle a Moral Principle”?P. R. Foot & Jonathan Harrison - 1954 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 28 (1):95-134.
Symposium: When Is a Principle a Moral Principle?P. R. Foot & Jonathan Harrison - 1954 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 28 (1):95 - 134.
The Philosopher's Defence of Morality.Philippa Foot - 1952 - Philosophy 27 (103):311 - 328.

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