Lorsque la logique rencontre l'argumentation

Argumentation 3 (1):45-57 (1989)
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Abstract

It is well known that classical logics are able to represent only some aspects of ordinary reasoning. In particular, by accepting the law of obversion, they remove the possibility of defining any but a propositional negation; certain natural uses of negation thus elude them. Logical theories do exist, however, that are exempt from such limitations. Among these theories are those of S. Leśniewski, which differ profoundly from classical formal systems. Unlike the latter, they do not have a determined list of functors of syntactical-semantical categories. Due to formalized directives for definitions, the logics of Leśniewski are constructed progressively, making new theses and consequently functors of new syntactical-semantical categories accessible. In this article we use some of these theses-definitions to define a principle of appropriateness. With this principle it is possible to represent certain logical subtleties that are used quite naturally but are neglected due to the law of obversion

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