Enacting is Enough

Psyche 15 (1):24-30 (2009)
In the action-space account of color, an emphasis is laid on implicit knowledge when it comes to experience, and explanatory ambitions are expressed. If the knowledge claims are interpreted in a strong way, the action-space account becomes a form of conservative enactivism, which is a kind of cognitivism. Only if the knowledge claims are weakly interpreted, the action space-account can be seen as a distinctive form of enactivism, but then all reductive explanatory ambitions must be abandoned
Keywords Enactivism  Embodied Cognition  Phenomenal Consciousness
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Daniel D. Hutto (2005). Knowing What? Radical Versus Conservative Enactivism. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):389-405.
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