David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (1):97-98 (2009)
Oaksford & Chater (O&C) begin in the halfway Bayesian house of assuming that minor premises in conditional inferences are certain. We demonstrate that this assumption is a serious limitation. They additionally suggest that appealing to Jeffrey's rule could make their approach more general. We present evidence that this rule is not limited enough to account for actual probability judgements
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Richard Jeffrey (1983). The Logic of Decision. University of Chicago Press.
Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater (2007). Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning. OUP Oxford.
Citations of this work BETA
Jiaying Zhao, Vincenzo Crupi, Katya Tentori, Branden Fitelson & Daniel Osherson (2012). Updating: Learning Versus Supposing. Cognition 124 (3):373-378.
Similar books and articles
Frank Döring (1999). Why Bayesian Psychology is Incomplete. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):389.
Daniel Osherson & Jiaying Zhao (2011). Updating Beliefs in Light of Uncertain Evidence: Descriptive Assessment of Jeffrey's Rule. Thinking and Reasoning 16 (4):288-307.
Carl G. Wagner (2003). Commuting Probability Revisions: The Uniformity Rule: In Memoriam Richard Jeffrey, 1926-2002. Erkenntnis 59 (3):349 - 364.
David Makinson (2012). Logical Questions Behind the Lottery and Preface Paradoxes: Lossy Rules for Uncertain Inference. Synthese 186 (2):511-529.
Stephane Quinn & Henry Markovits (2002). Conditional Reasoning with Causal Premises: Evidence for a Retrieval Model. Thinking and Reasoning 8 (3):179 – 191.
James Hawthorne (2004). Three Models of Sequential Belief Updating on Uncertain Evidence. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (1):89-123.
Christian George (1999). Evaluation of the Plausibility of a Conclusion Derivable From Several Arguments with Uncertain Premises. Thinking and Reasoning 5 (3):245 – 281.
Glenn Shafer (1981). Jeffrey's Rule of Conditioning. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):337-362.
Added to index2009-02-13
Total downloads8 ( #165,573 of 1,096,895 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #164,383 of 1,096,895 )
How can I increase my downloads?