The philosophical issue in machine consciousness

The truly philosophical issue in machine conscioiusness is whether machines can have 'hard consciounsess' (like in Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness). Criteria for hard consciousness are higher than for phenomenal consciousness, since the latter incorporates first-person functional consciousness.
Keywords Hard problem of consciousness  Chalmers  subject/object
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DOI 10.1142/S179384300900013X
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References found in this work BETA
Thomas Nagel (1974). What is It Like to Be a Bat? Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.

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Citations of this work BETA
Pentti O. A. Haikonen (2009). Qualia and Conscious Machines. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (02):225-234.
Pentti Oa Haikonen (2013). Consciousness and Sentient Robots. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 5 (1):11-26.
Aaron Sloman (2010). Machine Consciousness: Response to Commentaries. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (01):75-116.
Piotr Boltuc (2010). Sloman and H-Consciousness. International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (01):23-26.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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Piotr Boltuc (2012). The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness. Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 16 (2):187-207.
Jonathan Shear (1996). The Hard Problem: Closing the Empirical Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):54-68.

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