Abstract

Ethical intuitionism is the theory of cognition of moral facts and, what’s closely related, a theory that explores the meaning of moral judgments. I’ve been a proponent of this theory discussing it in some of my writing, most notably in Sens i prawda w etyce [Sense and Truth in Ethics], published as a 49th volume in the ”Biblioteka Myśli Semiotycznej” series. Part I of this paper addresses criticisms that Anna Jedynak raised in her review of my book. In part II, I will discuss a theory of moral behaviour proposed by Bogusław Wolniewicz in two of his articles. I consider the idea of moral cognition following from his conception and contrast it with the notion of moral cognition and moral meaning that follow from ethical intuitionism. I hope that the following discussion will help clarify and explain the main ideas behind ethical intuitionism considered as an epistemological and semiotic theory, however problematic it may appear to be.