Intuitionism and subjectivism

Metaphilosophy 22 (1-2):115-121 (1991)
Abstract
I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuitionism collapse into “subjectivism”, i.e., that they make truth in ethical theory depend on what people believe. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.M. Hare and Peter Singer.
Keywords intuitionism  moral intuitions  subjectivism  metaphilosophy  Hare, R.M.  Singer, Peter
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