Abstract

This book argues for a psychophysical dualism maintaining an experiential and ontological distinction between experiences and their physical correlates and/or causes. Ornstein criticizes reductionist extremes on either side of mentalism or physicalism but accepts, for example, Descartes’ conclusion that experience is the most important aspect of mind and Ryle’s emphasis on the intelligent behavioral component. The identity theory is the most distorted view of the mind even though neurophysiologists have discovered correlations of sensations and neural processes. Sensations are identical with neural processes only in the sense in which words can be said to be identical with the letters out of which they are composed. If the analogy applies, asserting ontological status for mental events does not presuppose a special mental substance. "Sensations may be neural processes and yet not be reducible to them," for knowing an item’s constituents does not ipso facto amount to knowing its "true nature."