How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing

Theoria 21 (2):185-194 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belief fails to be knowledge.

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10.1387/theoria.537

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