The Faces of Simplicity in Descartes’s Soul
In K. Corcilius, D. Perler & C. Helmig (eds.), The Parts of the Soul. De Gruyter (forthcoming)
|Abstract||In this paper I explain several ways in which Descartes denied that the human soul or mind is composite and the role this idea played in his thought. The mind is whole in the whole and whole in the parts of the body because it has no parts. Unlike body, the mind is indivisible, and this is a different idea from the thought that mind and body are incorruptible. Descartes connects the immortality of the soul with its status as a substance and as incorruptible rather than with its indivisibility.|
|Keywords||simplicity indivisibiility mind-body union incorruptibility immortality|
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