Abstract

In recent years, the concept of a ‘prohibition against representation’ and its ethical andpolitical implications for artistic practices past, present and future have been subjected torenewed critical scrutiny. While this interdiction derives from the Second Commandmentgiven by God to Moses, forbidding the creation of graven images or idols, it hasfrequently been invoked in secular contexts, and has acquired special resonance inongoing debates about the difficulty of adequately representing the event which hasbeen called the Holocaust or Shoah. The persistent claim that the Nazis’ persecution ofthe Jews and other communities remains beyond or unsusceptible to representation,and more specifically the assertion that it cannot or should not be recuperated withinimages, are often informed by a particular understanding of the Bilderverbot . However, certain survivors and scholarshave queried whether it is legitimate or helpful to reactivate this injunction in theaftermath of such atrocities. Jorge Semprun, Jacques Rancière, Jean-Luc Nancy andothers have variously criticised this move, along with associated rhetorics of ‘ineffability’,as confused and obscurantist, politically misleading and morally suspect.1Nancy, theauthor of one of the most forceful critiques in this vein, warns that the allegation thatrepresentation of the Holocaust is illegitimate rests on a misunderstanding ormisapplication of the original religious prohibition which he seeks to correct;‘“representation of the Shoah”’, he concludes, ‘is not only possible and licit, but in fact also necessary and imperative’