Metamathematics, Machines, and Gödel's Proof
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Cambridge University Press (1994)
The automatic verification of large parts of mathematics has been an aim of many mathematicians from Leibniz to Hilbert. While Gödel's first incompleteness theorem showed that no computer program could automatically prove certain true theorems in mathematics, the advent of electronic computers and sophisticated software means in practice there are many quite effective systems for automated reasoning that can be used for checking mathematical proofs. This book describes the use of a computer program to check the proofs of several celebrated theorems in metamathematics including those of Gödel and Church-Rosser. The computer verification using the Boyer-Moore theorem prover yields precise and rigorous proofs of these difficult theorems. It also demonstrates the range and power of automated proof checking technology. The mechanization of metamathematics itself has important implications for automated reasoning, because metatheorems can be applied as labor-saving devices to simplify proof construction.
|Keywords||Gödel's theorem Data processing Automatic theorem proving|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$44.25 used $158.53 new Amazon page|
|Call number||QA9.65.S53 1994|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Judson Webb (1968). Metamathematics and the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy of Science 35 (June):156-78.
Mark Steiner (2001). Wittgenstein as His Own Worst Enemy: The Case of Gödel's Theorem. Philosophia Mathematica 9 (3):257-279.
Panu Raatikainen (2005). On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
Zofia Adamowicz & Teresa Bigorajska (2001). Existentially Closed Structures and Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (1):349-356.
Raymond M. Smullyan (1992). Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. Oxford University Press.
Robert F. Hadley (2008). Consistency, Turing Computability and Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem. Minds and Machines 18 (1):1-15.
Francesco Berto (2009). The Gödel Paradox and Wittgenstein's Reasons. Philosophia Mathematica 17 (2):208-219.
Raymond M. Smullyan (1993). Recursion Theory for Metamathematics. Oxford University Press.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-01-28
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?