Rorty's mark of the mental and his disappearance theory

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 4 (September):191-93 (1974)
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Abstract

In “Incorrigibility as the Mark of the Mental,” Richard Rorty argues that although there is no characteristic that marks off everything that is mental, the contents of the stream of consciousness may be considered as that which is paradigmatically mental, and they are distinguished by the fact that sincere first-person reports about them are currently treated as incorrigible. He adds that “beliefs, desires, moods, emotions, intentions, etc.“ are also taken to be mental because reports about them are almost incorrigible.

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