Abstract

There are two common assumptions about well-being that I am especially concerned to dispute in this dissertation. The first assumption is that differences in kinds of prudential values can be reduced to differences in amount of prudential value. That is, that differences in the qualities of values can reliably be reduced to mere differences in quantity. The second assumption is that well-being is the appropriate object of moral concern. Consequentialist moral theories typically argue that morality requires the maximization of well-being across persons. Thus, such consequentialists suggest, the way to take another into account morally is to promote that person's well-being. ;Against the first assumption I take issue with hedonism, decision theory, and full information accounts of well-being. I argue that none of these popular methods of commensurating well-being is adequate to the task. Against the second assumption, I argue that, properly construed, one's well-being does not adequately capture the full range of one's concerns. I argue that this is a crucial fault with well-being promoting ethical theories. I suggest instead that we allow people to throw their weight in the moral calculus where they choose, provided that they understand the aggregation procedure