Abstract

This dissertation is about the interplay of convergence and divergence in ethics. Different moralities can diverge radically but, even then, they must converge to some extent if they are all going to be recognized as moralities. The dissertation goes into the philosophical debate on how best to account for the divergence and convergence of different moralities. ;This debate acquired prominence with the philosophy of Hegel. The main concern of Hegel's ethical philosophy is to explain radical divergence among ethical lives without losing sight of the broader world historical process on which the different ethical systems converge. Upon criticizing Kant for failing to acknowledge the degree to which ethical principles are embedded in a concrete set of institutions and social relations, Hegel opts for a contextualist account of ethics. Different moralities and ethical lives, in Hegel's view, diverge all the way down to their most fundamental principles. Yet, they converge insofar as they are part of a larger process of spiritual realization of freedom. They are structured by radically different conceptions of freedom but all these conceptions are part of a broader progression. ;Williams appropriates the Hegelian vision in his critique of modern contractualism. Williams's attack is principally directed at the claims to moral uniformity and to perspectival universality. By taking a parametric universalist form, however, modern contractualism can reject both claims and altogether escape Williams's criticisms. ;Parametric universalism remains faithful to the need for convergence but cannot come to terms with radical ethical divergence. For it is premised on the existence of a single, universal conception of the nature of morality. Moral philosophy should take a new tack. It should endorse pluralism in moral conceptions and, consequently, radical ethical divergence. It should, moreover, come to see that different moralities just bear a general family resemblance to each other. The family resemblance can be captured only through open-ended identification criteria. Moral critique of "other" moralities should not be formulated from the standpoint of a particular conception of the nature of morality but rather from a perspective that takes into account "other" moral conceptions as well as its own