Abstract

In this thesis I will defend analyticity. Quine has criticized analyticity. To answer Quine’s challenge, P. Boghossian distinguishes metaphysical analyticity and epistemological analyticity. He argues that epistemological analyticity exists while metaphysical analyticity does not. But, T. Williamson further rejects epistemological analyticity. In this thesis, I will defend both metaphysical analyticity and epistemological analyticity. In chapter I, I will generally define and discuss four conceptions of analyticity. I will show that there are different readings of each conception of analyticity. In chapter II, I will criticize K. Glüer, Hofmann & Horvath, and G. Russell’s arguments. They attempt to defend metaphysical analyticity. I will show that their arguments fail. To answer Quine’s challenge and to salve analyticity, Boghossian resorts to implicit definition and Glock suggests a normative view of analyticity. In chapter III, I will argue that their efforts fail. In chapter IV, I will defend metaphysical analyticity in a new perspective. The new perspective holds that metaphysical analyticity is true in virtue of concepts rather than meanings. I will argue that, analytic propositions are about the logical relations of realities. And these logical relations are the projections of our conceptual systems. So, the truth of analytic statements is completely determined by concepts they contain. And then, in chapter V, I will explain how concepts could completely determine the truth of analytic statements. Basing on some theories of concepts, I will show that the truth of analytic statements could be explained by means of the structure of concepts. In chapter VI, I will defend epistemological analyticity. T. Williamson has rejected epistemological analyticity. I will argue that Williamson’s argument fails. I will show that his definitions of analyticity are improper.