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  1. The concept of observation in science and philosophy.Dudley Shapere - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (4):485-525.
    Through a study of a sophisticated contemporary scientific experiment, it is shown how and why use of the term 'observation' in reference to that experiment departs from ordinary and philosophical usages which associate observation epistemically with perception. The role of "background information" is examined, and general conclusions are arrived at regarding the use of descriptive language in and in talking about science. These conclusions bring out the reasoning by which science builds on what it has learned, and, further, how that (...)
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  • Reason, reference, and the Quest for knowledge.Dudley Shapere - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (1):1-23.
    This paper examines the "causal theory of reference", according to which science aims at the discovery of "essences" which are the objects of reference of natural kind terms (among others). This theory has been advanced as an alternative to traditional views of "meaning", on which a number of philosophical accounts of science have relied, and which have been criticized earlier by the present author. However, this newer theory of reference is shown to be equally subject to fatal internal difficulties, and (...)
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  • Reason and the Search for Knowledge.Dudley Shapere - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):310-312.
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  • Doppelt crossed.Dudley Shapere - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (1):134-140.
    The chief objections raised by Doppelt (this issue, "The Philosophical Requirements for an Adequate Conception of Scientific Rationality") against my views fall into three groups: ones having to do with my concept of "success" (that I have provided no analysis of it, and that therefore my concept of "reason" in science is likewise unexplained; that it requires appeal to some universal criterion); ones having to do with the role of standards or criteria in science (how they are related to substantive (...)
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  • The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts.Rudolf Carnap - 1956 - In H. Feigl & M. Scriven (eds.), The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 38--76.
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