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  1. Some teasers concerning conditional probabilities.Maya Bar-Hillel & Ruma Falk - 1982 - Cognition 11 (2):109-122.
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  • Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
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  • Languages and Designs for Probability Judgment.Glenn Shafer & Amos Tversky - 1985 - Cognitive Science 9 (3):309-339.
    Theories of subjective probability are viewed as formal languages for analyzing evidence and expressing degrees of belief. This article focuses on two probability langauges, the Bayesian language and the language of belief functions (Shafer, 1976). We describe and compare the semantics (i.e., the meaning of the scale) and the syntax (i.e., the formal calculus) of these languages. We also investigate some of the designs for probability judgment afforded by the two languages.
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  • The use of statistical heuristics in everyday inductive reasoning.Richard E. Nisbett, David H. Krantz, Christopher Jepson & Ziva Kunda - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):339-363.
  • How not to solve it.Amos Nathan - 1986 - Philosophy of Science 53 (1):114-119.
    Six recently discussed problems in discrete probabilistic sample space, which have been found puzzling and even paradoxical, are reexamined. The importance is stressed of a sharp distinction between the formalization of mathematical problems and their formal solution that, applied to probability theory, must lead through the explicit partitioning of a sample space. If this approach is consistently followed, such problems reveal themselves to be either inherently ambiguous, and therefore without solution, or quite straightforward. In both cases nothing remains of any (...)
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  • Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
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