We argue that two long-term goals of AI research stand in tension with one another. The first involves creating AI that is safe, where this is understood as solving the problem of value alignment. The second involves creating artificial general intelligence, meaning AI that operates at or beyond human capacity across all or many intellectual domains. Our argument focuses on the human capacity to make what we call “existential choices”, choices that transform who we are as persons, including transforming what (...) we most deeply value or desire. It is a capacity for a kind of value misalignment, in that the values held prior to making such choices can be significantly different from (misaligned with) the values held after making them. Because of the connection to existentialist philosophers who highlight these choices, we call the resulting form of risk “existentialist risk.” It is, roughly, the risk that results from AI taking an active role in authoring its own values rather than passively going along with the values given to it. On our view, human-like intelligence requires a human-like capacity for value misalignment, which is in tension with the possibility of guaranteeing value alignment between AI and humans. (shrink)

Can the question "Why do what morality requires?" be answered in such a way that anyone regardless of their desires or interests has reason to be moral? One strategy for answering this question appeals to constitutive arguments. In general, constitutive arguments attempt to establish the normativity of rational requirements by pointing out that we are already committed to them insofar as we are believers or agents. This study is concerned with the general prospects for such arguments. It starts by explaining (...) the general constitutive argument strategy, followed by an examination of constitutive arguments that have been given regarding theoretical reason and the instrumental principle in practical reason, and concluding with a discussion of some challenges to constitutive arguments in moral philosophy and some possible responses to these challenges. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of existential choices and their role in practical reasoning. In contrast to other views that attempt to make sense of existential choices as a type of rational choice, the proposed account takes them to be choices among the normative outlooks that determine the reasons we have, and as such are nonrational. According to the argument in the paper, existential choices bring to light a feature of all choices, that they are made against the backdrop of (...) a normative outlook, which grounds the rationality of the choice but is not itself rationally determined. (shrink)

Reasons internalism holds that reasons for action contain an essential connection with motivation. I defend an account of reasons internalism based on the advisor model. The advisor model provides an account of reasons for action in terms of the advice of a more rational version of the agent. Contrary to Pettit and Smith's proposal and responding to Sobel's and Johnson's objections, I argue that the advisor model can provide an account of internal reasons and that it is too caught up (...) in the psychology of the actual agent to be able to account for anything other than internal reasons. (shrink)

This paper argues for interpreting Nietzsche along the lines of a self-constitution view. According to the self-constitution view, a person is a kind of creation: we constitute our selves throughout our lives. The self-constitution view may take more than one form: on the narrative version, the self is like a story, while on the Kantian version, the self is a set of principles or commitments. Taking Marya Schechtman’s and Christine Korsgaard’s accounts as paradigmatic, I take the self-constitution view to emphasize (...) practical considerations and the first person point of view and to conceive of the self as active in self-creation. The interpretation I offer can make sense of Nietzsche’s remarks about self-creation and of many of Nietzsche’s remarks about the self that would otherwise seem contradictory. In particular, Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical remarks about the self fit well with the self-constitution view as long as they are understood as theoretical claims that do not undermine the importance of the practical point of view. (shrink)

Human beings are internally inconsistent in various ways. One way to develop this thought involves using the language of value alignment: the values we hold are not always aligned with our behavior, and are not always aligned with each other. Because of this self-misalignment, there is room for potential projects of human enhancement that involve achieving a greater degree of value alignment than we presently have. Relatedly, discussions of AI ethics sometimes focus on what is known as the value alignment (...) problem, the challenge of how to build AI that acts in accordance with our human values. We argue that there is an especially close connection between solving the value alignment problem in AI ethics and using AI to pursue certain forms of human enhancement. But in addition, we also argue that there are important limits to what kinds of human enhancement can be pursued in this way, because some forms of human enhancement—namely moral revolutions—involve a kind of value misalignment rather than alignment. (shrink)

Constitutive arguments for the principles of practical reason attempt to justify normative requirements by claiming that we already accept them in so far as we are believers or agents. In two constitutive arguments for the requirement that we must will universally, Korsgaard attempts first to arrive at the requirement that we will universally from observations about the causality of the will, and secondly to establish that willing universally is constitutive of having a self. Some rational requirements may be established by (...) some version of this second argument, but the strategy does not seem promising when it comes to establishing the requirement that we will universally. I draw on the discussion of Korsgaard to highlight a challenge facing constitutive arguments in general. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Following Robert C. Solomon's Living with Nietzsche, I defend an interpretation of Nietzsche's views about freedom that are in line with the existentialist notion of self-creation. Given Nietzsche's emphasis on the limitations on human freedom, his critique of the notion of causa sui, and his critique of morality for relying on the assumption that we have free will, it may be surprising that he could be taken seriously as an existentialist—existentialism characteristically takes freedom and self-creation to be central to (...) the human condition. Nietzsche does not endorse a radical notion of freedom; he is rather emphatically critical of any such notion. However, I argue that he does have room for a certain kind of freedom and self-creation that supports Solomon's characterization of him as an existentialist. (shrink)

This paper develops a philosophical account of environmental racism and explains why having such an account is worthwhile. After reviewing some data points and common uses of the term linking environmental racism to the distribution of environmental burdens by race, I argue that environmental racism should be understood as referring to an unequal distribution caused by a history of racism. Environmental racism is thus analyzed in terms of two conditions: first, that environmental burdens and benefits be distributed according to race, (...) and second, that this distribution be partly caused by a history of racism, where this causal claim is understood counterfactually. The account entails that environmental racism is a derivative form of racism – it depends on other kinds of racism to exist – while being compatible with a variety of views about the more basic forms of racism. Given the proposed framework, I consider the kind of evidence needed to establish whether a given case is one of environmental racism and make the case for environmental racism being a concept worth focusing on as it can highlight a type of injustice that may otherwise go unnoticed. (shrink)

This Article explores the possibility of having ethical artificial intelligence. It argues that we face a dilemma in trying to develop artificial intelligence that is ethical: either we have to be able to codify ethics as a set of rules or we have to value a machine’s ability to make ethical mistakes so that it can learn ethics like children do. Neither path seems very promising, though perhaps by thinking about the difficulties with each we may come to a better (...) understanding of artificial intelligence and ourselves. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Living with Nietzsche, Robert C. Solomon defends the view that Nietzsche is an existentialist avant la lettre, a view that I defend. I concur with Ariela Tubert that her case that Nietzsche is a skeptic about metaphysical freedom supports Solomon's position, even if he did not necessarily see Nietzsche as holding a skeptical view. I counter Ivan Soll's arguments against Solomon's view that Nietzsche was mainly interested in promoting the life of passion, which Soll takes as (...) insufficiently appreciative of the importance of will to power in Nietzsche's thought. I argue that Solomon's construal of will to power is defensible and not really so distant from Soll's own stated interpretation. (shrink)

How does a subject who is competent to detect the irrationality of a belief that p, form her belief against weighty or even conclusive evidence to the contrary? The phenomenon of self-deception threatens a widely shared view of beliefs according to which they do not regularly correspond to emotions and evaluative attitudes. Accordingly, the most popular answer to this question is that the belief formed in self-deception is caused by an intention to form that belief. On this view, the state (...) of self-deception is taken to be a calculated outcome involving a person's intentional manipulation of her own thoughts. I argue that this answer is false and forms an impediment towards making sense of self-deception. I show that, contrary to philosophical prejudice, emotions and desires exert vast and systematic effects on the formation of beliefs. In this, and other, sections of the article, the results of experimental work are brought forward. Self-deception is portrayed here as resembling numerous instances of belief formation which are regularly affected by motivational factors. I argue that self-deceptive beliefs are direct expressions of the subject's wishes, fears and hopes. Qua beliefs which mostly correspond to such factors (rather than to evidence), self-deceptive states are a kind of fantasy. (shrink)

Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, judges and lawmakers sought to erase the visibility of unmarried women. In the public law arena, for example, legislators conflated women and wives for the purpose of the franchise, arguing that women did not need the vote because their husbands voted for them. In the private law arena, doctrines intended to guarantee support to unmarried women functioned by constructing single women's legal identities in relation to marriage, thereby suggesting that marriage could provide for (...) all women's material needs. This essay argues that understanding the history of single women's legal rights is critical to understanding the legal construction of marriage as the dominant institution for regulating all women's private relationships to men and public relationships to the state. Denying single women's existence allowed the law to ignore the potential threat they posed to a marriage-centric socio-legal order. Legal and political changes in the early decades of the twentieth century, however, made it increasingly difficult for the law to deny the existence of unmarried women. As single women gained social prominence, nonlegal writers in the 1930s and 1940s produced a new genre of prescriptive and descriptive literature for and about women living outside of marriage. Unlike earlier legal texts, these works embraced single women as a permanent and visible part of society. Like their legal predecessors, however, these modern authors sought to minimize the threat posed by single women to the institution of marriage, pointing to single women as proof of marriage's modern, consensual, democratic nature. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo se analizan los términos utilizados por E. Husserl en el segundo volumen de Ideas relativas a una fenomenología pura y a una filosofía fenomenológica. Investigaciones fenomenológicas sobre la constitución para nombrar la corporeidad humana. Nos interesa, dentro del abanico semántico desplegado por el filósofo, atender al concepto de Leibköper y mostrar su independencia respecto del par Leib y Körper, en tanto y en cuanto permite describir una dimensión de la experiencia que las otras nociones no parecen (...) agotar. Se discuten, además, las interpretaciones de E. Behnke (1996) y N. Depraz (2001) sobre el concepto de Leibkörper. Mientras para la primera, se trataría de una definición estrictamente naturalista de la corporalidad que debe ser excluida en la actitud fenomenológica, para la segunda es, más bien, un concepto esencialmente fenomenológico, el de cuerpo vivido. Teniendo en cuenta el contexto general de fundamentación de una Fenomenología de la corporeidad que anima el trabajo, el esclarecimiento de esta noción resulta de vital importancia. (shrink)

The problematic concept guiding this reflection is that set forth, since the publication of Naturalizing Phenomenology (1999) by both defenders and critics of the project aimed at reintroducing the contributions of phenomenology into the research carried out by contemporary cognitive science. The objective is to show that certain aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology especially that of his early period, are a valuable contribution for a theory of cognition and provide the bases for a non-reductionist naturalization of phenomenology as the science of (...) consciousness. (shrink)

Q 1: How is it possible for a competent subject to detect the irrationality of a belief that p, to form and maintain his belief that not-p against weighty or conclusive evidence to the contrary?

This commentary concentrates on two flaws in Mele's account. The first is Mele's attempt to account for self-deception by appealing to a desire to believe, together with an instrumental belief concerning the means of satisfying this desire. Contrary to Mele, it is argued that such an account requires a recognition on the part of agents that their actions instantiate these means. Second, Mele misidentifies the most essential – and flawed – ingredient of the standard approach to self-deception, the agent's desire (...) to form the belief (the belief that is undermined by the evidence). This ingredient is retained in Mele's own account of self-deception. (shrink)

El dualismo en filosofía pone el pemsamiento en una encrucijada fundamental, pues la reflexión acerca del alma oscurece y abandona sin demasiada explicación el ámbito de lo corpóreo, al que están atados también las sensaciones, los sentimientos y las pasiones. Sobre la posibilidad de un discurso positivo acerca del cuerpo, que no acabe en otra forma de reduccionismo en sentido inverso, es que trate este artículo en que discuten y concilian algunas opiniones de Descartes, Merleau-Ponty, Foucault, Barler y Le Breton.

The notions of acting against one's better judgment and self-deception are notoriously problematic. Often, they have been deemed incoherent in a tradition which may be traced back to Socrates. My inquiry into these notions, unlike many others, explicitly draws upon considerations pertaining to the interpretation of speech and action and the role which rationality plays within it, the nature of psychological explanation and the framework in which it is embedded. This work is motivated by the view that, if carried out (...) properly, a study of the mind which focuses on deviant phenomena will also improve understanding of standard cases of action and belief-formation. ;The possibility of acting against one's better judgment seems, prima facie, to be at odds with our notion of action. I begin by critically examining several arguments purporting to show that akrasia is in fact incompatible with the notion of a free intentional action. I show that, overall, an agent appears more rational, and thus more intelligible, if instances of local irrationality of this kind are acknowledged as such rather than re-interpreted as non-akratic actions. The position I reject represents the agent as significantly more inconsistent than necessary, and in some sense, undermines the endeavor of a psychological explanation. ;I proceed to argue that reasons play a unique role in the context of explaining actions. At the same time, the framework of action explanation must be expanded so as to include additional familiar elements such as emotions and fantasies in order to improve understanding of the choices we make. I argue that the causal influence of these elements cannot be fully captured as merely a source of reasons for actions; thus, some of the mental causes responsible for our actions lie outside the realm of reasons. Finally, I show how expanding the explanatory framework of actions makes the phenomenon of akrasia less puzzling in some respects; indeed, this expansion should incline us to expect that persons would act akratically on occasion. ;My discussion of self-deception focuses on two major questions: whether every case of self-deception involves the presence of an intention to form a belief and to what extent this phenomenon warrants a view of the mind as divided. With respect to the first question, I suggest that a view which refrains from interpreting every case of self-deception as involving an intention to form a belief is psychologically more plausible and accounts for some key cases for which the intentionalist view fails to account. As for the second question, I contend that there are at least two ways in which the mind may be properly seen as divided, yet divisions which introduce homuncularism should be rejected. What emerges from my discussion of self-deception, as well as the preceding discussion of akrasia, is a view of the mind that essentially incorporates both rational and non-rational elements. (shrink)

We use phenomenology to reflect on the experience of being with others as mediated by screens through videoconferencing platforms, a phenomenon accelerated by the Covid-19 pandemic and social isolation measures. We explore two directions to explain the intersubjective experience of a videoconference. One direction introduces a conceptual background based on previous contributions in phenomenology, while the other one is more speculative: we introduce the novel idea of a phantom other. First, we understand this phenomenon either as a correlate of image (...) consciousness or as a paradoxical perception. Then, we introduce the phantom other using ideas offered in phenomenological descriptions in which the phantom limb appears as a quasi-presence. The phantom other is the same flesh and blood body with whom I co-constitute senses of the world. In a videoconference, the other appears as a whole body with which I coordinate, although she appears as a phantom other. (shrink)

El interés de este trabajo está orientado a un problema escasamente considerado por los estudiosos de la fenomenología, la agencia experta de sujetos encarnados. Una explicación plausible de esta falta de atención sería que los fenomenólogos se han concentrado en la agencia de sujetos normales y de personas enfermas, y se han dedicado menos a las performances expertas de bailarines y deportistas. En este artículo intentaré complementar las investigaciones fenomenológicas precedentes con descripciones de la agencia corporal de sujetos entrenados para (...) ofrecer una visión integrada de la acción humana. Mi hipótesis es que los agentes expertos desarrollan un tipo de cognición corporal, diferente de la que se da en la experiencia ordinaria. La cognición corporal implicada en la experticia se caracteriza por actuar en el campo de lo virtual. Con el objetivo de dar una descripción de la cognición corporal en la experticia realizo una revisión de la definición intencional del movimiento, propongo una distinción entre movimiento reflejo, habitual y mecánico y caracterizo el movimiento experto. Para una mejor comprensión del fenómeno, considero, además, ejemplos y descripciones de performances ofrecidas por los verdaderos protagonistas del comportamiento experto en escenarios competitivos. (shrink)

En este trabajo consideraré la recepción de _Phénoménologie de la Perception _en las Ciencias Cognitivas contemporáneas, con el objetivo de subrayar la original comprensión de la relación entre ciencia y filosofía propuesta por Merleau-Ponty en su obra. Merleau-Ponty, guiado por el lema husserliano de “volver a las cosas mismas”, critica a la ciencia concebida como resultado del pensamiento objetivo. En su opinión, la ciencia privilegia la explicación sobre la descripción y oculta así, debajo de sus constructos teóricos, la validez originaria (...) de la experiencia vivida. Sin embargo, en la comprensión merleau-pontyana de la percepción está también implicada la ciencia como fuente de material para la investigación fenomenológica. A la luz de estas consideraciones sobre el papel desempeñado por la ciencia en la comprensión fenomenológica de la experiencia, me propongo reconsiderar dos lecturas críticas dirigidas contra la comprensión del legado merleau-pontyano en el campo de investigación de las Ciencias Cognitivas. La primera de ellas es desarrollada por G. B. Madison y sus críticas apuntan al logocentrismo implicado en las Ciencias Cognitivas. La segunda es sostenida por C. Pollard para quien las Ciencias Cognitivas malinterpretan el proyecto merleau-pontyano al ignorar el objetivo trascendental que la motiva. (shrink)

O trabalho desenvolvido ao longos dos últimos anos por Agustin Serrano de Haro, nomeadamente no contexto das investigações fenomenológicas sobre o tema da corporeidade e, mais especificamente, sobre a questão da dor física, colocaram o seu nome entre os grandes especialistas mundiais nestas matérias. Ao importante número de ensaios publicados sobre os temas referidos, juntam-‑se alguns títulos de rara originalidade que vieram confirmar a qualidade do investigador do CSIC de Madrid. O objetivo da presente entrevista a Agustín Serrano de Haro (...) é o de dar a conhecer de forma alternativa o trabalho e o pensamento deste importante investigador espanhol contemporâneo. (shrink)

Neste breve texto é apresentado o conjunto de trabalhos de pesquisa que se publicam aqui em uma seção especial dedicada aos resultados da pesquisa do Projeto Internacional de Investigação “Fenomenología del Cuerpo y Análisis del dolor II”.

El presente trabajo intenta constituir un aporte a la tarea de ganar precisión conceptual en la consideración de las temáticas del espacio y el movimiento humano desde una perspectiva fenomenológica y toma como horizonte teórico las lúcidas reflexiones de Maurice Merleau-Ponty sobre estas temáticas. Se analizan en el mismo los aportes de la distinción entre una espacialidad de situación y una espacialidad de posición, se revisan de manera crítica las limitaciones de la misma y se propone la noción de postura (...) como un complemento descriptivo que permite hacer extensiva la reflexión merleaupontiana acerca del movimiento a fenómenos motrices de agentes diestros y entrenados. (shrink)

El concepto problemático que guía este trabajo es el que, a partir de la aparición del volumen Naturalizing Phenomenology (1999), han propuesto los defensores, así como también los detractores, del proyecto que pretende re-introducir el aporte de la fenomenología en la investigación de las ciencias ..

Can Louisiana tell us something about civil law vs. common law regimes of slavery? What can the Louisiana experience tell us about a civil law jurisdiction "transplanted" in a common-law country? Louisiana is unique among American states in having been governed first by France, then by Spain, before becoming a U.S. territory and state in the nineteenth century. Unlike other slave states, it operated under a civil code, first the Digest of 1808, and then the Code of 1825. With regard (...) to the regulation of slaves, these codes also incorporated a "Black Code," first adopted in 1806, which owed a great deal to both French and Spanish law. Comparisons of Louisiana with other slave states tend to emphasize the uniqueness of New Orleans' three-tier caste system, with a significant population of gens de couleur libre (free people of color), and the ameliorative influence of Spanish law. This reflects more general assumptions about comparative race and slavery in the Americas, based on the work of Frank Tannenbaum and other historians of an earlier generation, who drew sharp contrasts between slavery in British and Spanish America. How does the comparison shift if we turn our attention away from slave codes, where Tannenbaum focused, to the "law in action"? At the local level, one can see the way slaves took advantage of the gap between rules and enforcement, and to fathom racial meanings at the level of day-to-day interactions rather than comparisions of formal rules. This essay surveys three areas of law involving slaves - manumission, racial identity, and "redhibition" (breach of warranty) - to compare Louisiana to other jurisdictions, and particularly to its common-law neighbors. (shrink)

The history of race in the nineteenth-century United States is often told as a story of black and white in the South, and white and Indian in the West, with little attention to the intersection between black and Indian. This article explores the history of nineteenth-century America's little races - racially ambiguous communities of African, Indian, and European origin up and down the Eastern seaboard. These communities came under increasing pressure in the years leading up to the Civil War and (...) in its aftermath to fall on one side or the other of a black-white color line. Drawing on trial records of cases litigating the racial identity of the Melungeons of Tennessee, the Croatans/Lumbee of North Carolina, and the Narragansett of Rhode Island, this article looks at the differing paths these three groups took in the face of Jim Crow: the Melungeons claiming whiteness; the Croatans/Lumbee asserting Indian identity and rejecting association with blacks; the Narragansett asserting Indian identity without rejecting their African origins. Members of these communities found that they could achieve full citizenship in the U.S. polity only to the extent that they abandoned their self-governance and distanced themselves from people of African descent. (shrink)

When is the time of slavery? Is slavery a part of our nation's experience best buried in the deep past, or are its echoes still being felt today? Has our nation's trajectory been one of continuous progress from slavery to freedom, or did change happen fitfully and incompletely? And was slavery an institution defined by race, or was race only incidental to its origins and operation? Contemporary debates about racial justice, and in particular about redress for racial injustice, turn not (...) only on moral and practical concerns, but on the answers to these questions. The jurisprudence of affirmative action and reparations draws on competing histories of slavery and its aftermath in the United States. This essay will explore the way histories of slavery have been used in judicial opinions, legal scholarship and popular political tracts arguing over racial justice, affirmative action, and reparations for African Americans. It lays out a taxonomy of conservative and liberal histories of slavery, and suggests the implications and limitations of these historical narratives. (shrink)

Resumen Este trabajo tiene por objetivo considerar el papel atribuido al cuerpo en la discusión contemporánea sobre emociones. Examinaré en particular la metáfora de las emociones en el teatro del cuerpo, presentada por A.Damásio, con el propósito de revisar críticamente dos modelos dominantes de encarnación de la emoción-uno externalista o behaviorista y otro internalista o neurobiológico- y los problemas que ellos suscitan. Revisaré el concepto de cuerpo implicado en esos modelos e intentaré ofrecer una comprensión alternativa de la emoción como (...) un fenómeno corporal y motriz. Para ello profundizaré el análisis de la relación entre movimiento y emoción bajo los presupuestos de la Fenomenología de la Corporeidad desarrollada por M. Merleau-Ponty y sus seguidores. Mi propuesta alternativa consistirá, entonces, en comprender la emoción como performance corporal, lo cual nos proporcionará un modo de evitar los puntos de vista dualistas y reduccionistas comúnmente sostenidos sobre emociones.The central aim of this paper will be to consider the role assigned to the body in contemporary discussions about emotions. I will particularly examine the metaphor of the emotions in the theater of the body, presented by A. Damásio, with the purpose of raising doubts about two dominant models of embodiment of emotions -an externalist or behaviorist and an internal or neurobiological -which remain trapped in several difficulties. So I will reject the general concept of body these models are committed with, and I will suggest an alternative understanding of emotions along the line of a bodily and motor phenomenon. To do that, I will deepen the analysis of the relationship between movement and emotion by considering it under the theoretical framework provided by the Phenomenology of Body developed by M. Merleau-Ponty and his followers. Thus, my alternative proposal will be to take emotions as a bodily performance which can provide us a way to avoid both the dualist and the reductionist standpoint commonly held on emotions. (shrink)

RESUMEN:Este artículo aborda la concepción de la cognición encarnada propuesta por M. Merleau-Pontyen dos momentos de su obra, en el contexto de Fenomenología de la percepción y en el Lo visible y lo invisible. El objetivo del artículo consiste en describir las consecuencias epistemo1 Este trabajo ha sido realizado en el marco del PIP CONICET 114-20110100073, «La posibilidad de fundamentación fenomenológica de la intencionalidad corporal: análisis y descripción de la relación percepción y movimiento», 2012-2014 y del Proyecto de Investigación «Fenomenología (...) del cuerpo y análisis del dolor» (FFI 2013-43240-P). Dirección General de Investigación Científica y Técnica. Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad. España. Director: Dr. Agustín Serrano de Haro. Agradezco los comentarios de la Lic. Paula Diaz Romero y las instancias de discusión de las ideas previas al trabajo que tuvieron lugar en el marco de reuniones del grupo de investigación «Fenomenología de la corporeidad» (SECYT-UNC).estudio de la estrecha relación entre percepción y movimiento permitiría aclarar el modelo de cognición encarnada propuesto por Merleau-Ponty y contribuiría a comprender el rol centrallógicas del giro ontológico operado en la última etapa del pensamiento merleau-pontyano. El del cuerpo en la cognición.PALABRAS CLAVES:FENOMENOLOGÍA-CUERPO-GIRO-ONTOLÓGICO-GIRO EPISTEMOLÓGICOABSTRACT:This article addresses Merleau-Ponty´s conception of embodied cognition in two moments ofhis work, in the context of Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible.The central aim of this article consists in describing the epistemological consequences of theontological turn given by merleau-pontian later thought. The study of the close relationship between perception and movement would shed light on the model of embodied cognition proposedby Merleau-Ponty and could contribute to understand the central role of the body in cognition. KEYWORDSPHENOMENOLOGY-BODY-ONTOLOGICAL TURN-EPISTEMOLOGICAL TURN. (shrink)