Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...) and epistemology of visual perception. (shrink)

Introduction to the topical collection "The Structure of Perceptual Objects"—with contributions by Mohan Matthen, EJ Green, Alisa Mandrigin, Blazej Skrzypulec, and Anna Drożdżowicz.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Gestalt psychologists put forward the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, which was meant to replace Fechner’s obscure notion of psychophysical parallelism and provide a heuristics that may facilitate the search for the neural correlates of the mind. However, the concept has generated much confusion in the debate, and today its role is still unclear. In this contribution, I will attempt a little conceptual spadework in clarifying the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, focusing exclusively on conscious (...) visual perceptual experience and its neural correlates. Firstly, I will outline the history of our concept, and its alleged metaphysical and epistemic roles. Then, I will clarify the nature of isomorphism and rule out its metaphysical role. Finally, I will review some epistemic roles of our concept, zooming in on the work of Jean Petitot, and suggest that it does not play a relevant heuristic role. I conclude suggesting that psychoneural isomorphism might be an indicator of robustness for certain mathematical descriptions of perceptual content. (shrink)

The sensorimotor theory of vision and visual consciousness is often described as a radical alternative to the computational and connectionist orthodoxy in the study of visual perception. However, it is far from clear whether the theory represents a significant departure from orthodox approaches or whether it is an enrichment of it. In this study, I tackle this issue by focusing on the explanatory structure of the sensorimotor theory. I argue that the standard formulation of the theory subscribes to the same (...) theses of the dynamical hypothesis and that it affords covering-law explanations. This however exposes the theory to the mere description worry and generates a puzzle about the role of representations. I then argue that the sensorimotor theory is compatible with a mechanistic framework, and show how this can overcome the mere description worry and solve the problem of the explanatory role of representations. By doing so, it will be shown that the theory should be understood as an enrichment of the orthodoxy, rather than an alternative. (shrink)

Cognitive representations are typically analysed in terms of content, vehicle and format. While current work on formats appeals to intuitions about external representations, such as words and maps, in this paper we develop a computational view of formats that does not rely on intuitions. In our view, formats are individuated by the computational profiles of vehicles, i.e., the set of constraints that fix the computational transformations vehicles can undergo. The resulting picture is strongly pluralistic, it makes space for a variety (...) of different formats, and is intimately tied to the computational approach to cognition in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Many artists, art critics, and poets suggest that an aesthetic appreciation of artworks may modify our perception of the world, including quotidian things and scenes. I call this Art-to-World, AtW. Focusing on visual artworks, in this paper I articulate an empirically-informed account of AtW that is based on content-related views of aesthetic experience, and on Goodman’s and Elgin’s concept of exemplification. An aesthetic encounter with artworks demands paying attention to its aesthetic, expressive, or design properties that realize its purpose. Attention (...) to these properties make percipients better able to spot them in other entities and scenes as well. The upshot is that an aesthetic commerce with artworks enlarges the scope of what we are able to see and has therefore momentous epistemic consequences. (shrink)

Many artists, art critics, and poets suggest that an aesthetic appreciation of artworks may modify our perception of the world, including quotidian things and scenes. I call this Art-to-World, AtW. Focusing on visual artworks, in this paper I articulate an empirically-informed account of AtW that is based on content related views of aesthetic experience, and on Goodman’s and Elgin’s concept of exemplification. An aesthetic encounter with artworks demands paying attention to its aesthetic, expressive, or design properties that realize its purpose. (...) Attention to these properties make percipients better able to spot them in other entities and scenes as well. The upshot is that an aesthetic commerce with artworks enlarges the scope of what we are able to see and has therefore momentous epistemic consequences. (shrink)

According to the sensorimotor account, vision does not imply theconstruction of internally generated representations of the environment, butit isthe skillful exercise of the sensorimotor contingencies obeying sense-specific laws. In this short study, I focus on the notion of “sensorimotor law” and characterize the kind of explanation providedby the sensorimotor theory as a form of covering law model. I then question the nature of such sensorimotor laws and describe them as mechanisms. I show that a mechanistic interpretation provides a better account (...) of the sensorimotor invariances, which fosters us to rebalance the explanatory burden of sensorimotor action and information. Finally, I show that the question of the roleof representations within the sensorimotor theory should be reconsidered. (shrink)

I argue for a manipulationist-mechanistic framework for content-NCC research in the case of visual consciousness (Bechtel 2008; Neisser 2012). Reference to mechanisms is common in the NCC research. Furthermore, recent developments in non-invasive brain stimulation techniques (NIBS) lend support to a manipulationist standpoint. The crucial question is to understand what is changed after manipulation of a brain mechanism. In the second part of the paper I review the literature on intentionalism, and argue that intervention on the neural mechanism is likely (...) to change the intentional content of consciousness. This urges us to shift from content-NCC to what I call “intentional mechanisms”. Such mechanisms, it is argued, should be understood as neural prerequisites of conscious visual experience. (shrink)

In recent years, we have witnessed a renewed interest in phenomenological approaches to the study of the mind. Since neuroscience must still rely on phenomenological reports to tackle the problem of consciousness, the phenomenological approaches are introduced as a methodological remedy in the study of the mind. Two principles underlie such approaches: to exploit the heuristic value of phenomenological descriptions, and the need for mutual constraints between such descriptions and scientific evidence in theory construction. To fulfill this project, a central (...) question is to understand how phenomenology can be naturalized. According to some researchers, the naturalization of phenomenology could only be achieved by means of a mathematization of the phenomenological descriptions. However, in this study it will be shown that mathematization is a form of theory reduction that is unable to adequately account for the two principles underlying the phenomenological approaches. In contrast with mathematization, we put forward an alternative framework for naturalizing phenomenology based on interfield theories: a non-reductionist model of interfield integration. (shrink)

Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Balaguer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. For the purposes of this paper, we will examine several notions of consistency with respect to how they can provide a platon-ist epistemology of mathematics. Only a Gödelian notion, we suggest, can provide a satisfactory guide to (...) a platonist ontology. Is consistency the sort of thing that could provide a guide to mathematical ontology? If so, which notion of consistency suits this purpose? Mark Bala-guer holds such a view in the context of platonism, the view that mathematical objects are non-causal, non-spatiotemporal, and non-mental. Balaguer's version of Platonism, Full-Blooded Platonism (FBP), is the view that "there are as many abstract mathematical objects as there could be-i.e., there actually exist abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds" (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381). He continues: Since FBP says that there are abstract mathematical objects of all possible kinds, it follows that if FBP is true, then every purely mathematical theory that could be true-i.e., that is internally consistent-accurately describes some collection of actually existing abstract objects. Thus it follows from FBP that in order to acquire knowledge of abstract objects, all we have to do is come up with an internally consistent purely mathematical theory (and know that it is internally consistent). (Balaguer, 2017, p. 381) * To be published in 43rd International Wittgenstein Symposium proceedings. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness are based on widely different concepts of its nature, most or all of which probably embody aspects of the truth about it. Starting with a concept of consciousness indicated by the phrase “the feeling of what happens” (the title of a book by Antonio Damásio), we attempt to build a framework capable of supporting and resolving divergent views. We picture consciousness in terms of Reality experiencing itself from the perspective of cognitive agents. Each conscious experience is (...) regarded as composed of momentary feeling events that are combined by recognition and evaluation into extended conscious episodes that bind cognitive contents with a wide range of apparent durations (0.1 secs to 2 or more secs, for us humans, depending on circumstances and context). Three necessary conditions for the existence of consciousness are identified: a) a ground of Reality, envisaged as an universal field of potentiality encompassing all possible manifestations, whether material or 'mental'; b) a transitional zone, leading to; c) a manifest world with its fundamental divisions into material, 'informational' and quale-endowed aspects. We explore ideas about the nature of these necessary conditions, how they may relate to one another and whether our suggestions have empirical implications. (shrink)

Trecho da obra: "Nos itinerários históricos mais recentes, o corpo atlético, de alto rendimento, tornou-se metáfora da superação de si e lugar de sacralização de quase ilimitados recursos tecnocientíficos. (...) O desempenho dos corpos no campo desportivo pode ser compreendido como concretização daquela mitologia do progresso que moldou a experiência do tempo na modernidade. (...) Os trânsitos entre desporto, ética e transcendência foram o objecto de estudo e reflexão de um colóquio internacional realizado na Universidade Católica Portuguesa, e o presente (...) volume, dando continuidade a uma política de publicação do Instituto Português do Desporto e Juventude / Plano Nacional de Ética no Desporto, reúne os textos apresentados, procurando, assim, atingir um público mais amplo e contribuir para o aprofundamento desta linha de indagação na sociedade portuguesa.". (shrink)

La recepción europea de Gómez Dávila comenzó a desplegarse de manera más amplia a partir de la lectura y difusión realizada por Franco Volpi. Este artículo alude a la manera como dicha lectura concretó las interpretaciones del colombiano, principalmente a la luz de una filosofía práctica y una perspectiva crítica. De dichas posturas, el italiano destaca la vocación vital y el carácter provocador del pensamiento de Gómez Dávila.

La religión ha sido objeto de estudio por parte de distintas disciplinas. En examen crítico se presentan aquí aportaciones de ciencia al conocimiento de ella. El adepto de una religión rara vez la examina o se autoexamina. No suele conocer su propia religiosidad. Le asusta pensar que esta es un hecho humano, al igual que otros, no sobrenatural. Pero es así. Los hechos de religión pueden ser no solo descritos, sino también explicados, al igual que otros hechos sociales. Hubo y (...) hay factores históricos, sociales, psicológicos, antropológicos, que los han suscitado. El libro es un estudio no confesional de la religión, el cual difiere de la teología tanto como la química difiere de la alquimia; y en él se toma nota de la pérdida de relevancia de lo religioso en el Occidente moderno. (Fuente: La Casa del Libro). (shrink)

In his paraphasis of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Avicenna seems to adopt a first principle distintc form the one adopted by the Greek philosopher for this science. In fact, some interpreters consider him as prefering the principle of third excluded instead of the principle of non contradiction. Since I desagree with this thesis, I propose to analyse here Avicenna’s formulation of the first principle. In order to do that, I propose, first, to clarify the meaning of the first principle by looking to (...) one of the most important modern critics: Jan Lukasiewicz. To put it briefly, the question I will try to answer is: how Avicenna and Aristotle justify the nature of the logical relations. The article finishes with make some general remarks on Avicenna’s defense of the first principle. (shrink)

The Critique of Pure Reason—Kant’s First Critique—is one of the most studied texts in intellectual history, but as Alfredo Ferrarin points out in this radically original book, most of that study has focused only on very select parts. Likewise, Kant’s oeuvre as a whole has been compartmentalized, the three Critiques held in rigid isolation from one another. Working against the standard reading of Kant that such compartmentalization has produced, The Powers of Pure Reason explores forgotten parts of the First (...) Critique in order to find an exciting, new, and ultimately central set of concerns by which to read all of Kant’s works. Ferrarin blows the dust off of two egregiously overlooked sections of the First Critique—the Transcendental Dialectic and the Doctrine of Method. There he discovers what he argues is the Critique’s greatest achievement: a conception of the unity of reason and an exploration of the powers it has to reach beyond itself and legislate over the world. With this in mind, Ferrarin dismantles the common vision of Kant as a philosopher writing separately on epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics and natural teleology, showing that the three Critiques are united by this underlying theme: the autonomy and teleology of reason, its power and ends. The result is a refreshing new view of Kant, and of reason itself. (shrink)

LA JUVENTUD CONSUMIDA: REPRESENTACIONES DE LO JUVENIL EN EL DISCURSO PUBLICITARIO.

The functional role of mirror neurons has been assessed in many different ways. They have been regarded, inter alia, as the core mechanism of mind reading, the mechanism of language understanding, the mechanism of imitation. In this paper we will discuss the thesis according to which MNs are a conceptual mechanism. This hypothesis is attractive since it could accommodate in an apparently simple way all the above-mentioned interpretations. We shall take into consideration some reasons suggesting the conceptualist characterization of MNs, (...) as well as some possible replies. We shall figure out how an argument for the conceptualist hypothesis could be deployed, focusing on the notion of off-line processes, which turns out to be the crucial property necessary to ascribe concept possession. Our conclusion will be that, despite of there being some evidence for the conceptualist account, the issue cannot be definitely settled, because there are both experimental shortages and conceptual difficulties. In particular, there are three distinct senses in which MNs can be regarded as a conceptual mechanism, but we shall argue that only one of these interpretations can be defended. (shrink)

This book approaches the contemporary era--a period comprised between the late nineteenth and the twenty first centuries--as an archaeological age that can be defined by specific material processes. It argues that the materiality of our era, and particularly its ruins and rubbish, tells something profound and original about us--something disturbing, as well. The aim of the book is twofold: it reflects on the theory and practice of the archaeology of the contemporary past--its epistemology, politics, ethics and aesthetics--and it seeks to (...) characterize the present based on the three excesses that define it: spatial, temporal and material. All of them leave traces that can be explored archaeologically. This is the first attempt at describing the contemporary era from an archaeological point of view. Global in scope, the case studies that illustrate the argument come from every continent. The bibliography is also global and includes works from peripheral traditions that are rarely considered. This is a book of archaeology, but one that intends to go beyond academic limits. For that, it engages in a dialogue with philosophy, anthropology, history and geography. The book will be essential reading for students and practitioners of the archaeology of the contemporary past, historical archaeology and archaeological theory. But it will also be of interest to anybody concerned with globalization, modernity and the Anthropocene. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza en primera instancia la lectura y consideración hermenéutica que Ernesto Volkening realiza de la obra de Nicolás Gómez Dávila. Tras una presentación de las pautas interpretativas que se dan en el Diario de lectura de Volkening, se considera luego el interés de losautores por la arquitectura y el urbanismo modernos, como claves para la crítica del modo de vida reificante del hombre actual. Posteriormente, se ilustran las pautas que abordan la historia y la historicidad, bajo la idea (...) de una comprensión hermenéutica gestada en los contextos, opuesta a cualquier determinismo y puesta en marcha bajo la impronta de la singularidad e individualidad. (shrink)

My aim in this article is to understand the role of imagination and practical judgment in Kant's moral philosophy. After a comparison of Kant with Rousseau, I explore Kant's moral philosophy itself — unlike Hannah Arendt, who finds in the enlarged mentality of the third Critique the ground for the activity of imagination in a shared world. Instead, I place the concept of moral legislation in its background, the reflection on particulars relevant to deliberation, and discuss the mutual relation of (...) reflection and determination. Not only reflection and determination work together; imagination and judgment imply one another essentially, as interpretation of what is relevant, and as a principle of orientation in the choice of the maxim against the backdrop of a uniform and ordered world. The concepts of analogy and symbolic exhibition turn out to be crucial for how reason represents to itself the reality of ideas in the world. (shrink)