The Estonian philosopher Rein Vihalemm (1938–2015) wished to reform realism in the philosophy of science. He was dissatisfied with the mainstream analytic philosophy of science—scientific realism and the various anti-realisms alike. He considered these approaches theory-driven and hence too distanced from actual scientific practice. His alternative, which he called practical realism, was inspired and influenced by Joseph Rouse’s original reading of Thomas Kuhn. Moreover, Vihalemm viewed as important some lessons from Marxism, which was prevalent in Estonian philosophy during the Soviet (...) occupation. For him, Marx himself inaugurated practical realism with his novel notion of practice that does not consider agency distinct from nature. He also mentions Kant, interpreted in a realistic manner, as a significant influence for his thesis that concepts only apply to practice. In this article, I will critically examine practical realism from the standpoint of classical pragmatism. My primary question is: what kind of realism practical realism can possibly be. (shrink)

In this article, I analyse the role of the concepts of ‘practice,’ ‘relations,’ and ‘process’ in Rein Vihalemm’s philosophy of science and the way he defined and articulated these concepts to study the production of scientific knowledge. Then, following Vihalemm’s line of reasoning, I will show how this approach is promising for thinking in a new way about some developments in contemporary sciences and technology.

Rein Vihalemm has defined the concept of φ-sciences primarily through scientific models, while emphasising that they are empirical sciences. His specification of such sciences includes references to Galileo, Kant, and Heidegger, but lacks in detail and, most notably, fails to explicate how the models of these sciences are linked to the material world they aim to describe. I first analyse Galileo’s theoretical proceedings in terms of preplanning, the essence of phaenomena, and mathematicity, which can either explicitly or implicitly be viewed (...) as important characteristics of φ-sciences, acknowledged by Vihalemm. Based on this new clarification and additional sources, I will then explore φ-scientific measurement as the link between models and matter and discuss whether Galileo’s own measurements can be regarded as such. (shrink)

The current issue, titled The Philosophical Legacy of Rein Vihalemm: Reflections and Expansions, is a sequel to previous publications that have paid tribute to the work and legacy of Rein Vihalemm (1938–2015), all supported by the Estonian Research Council (grant PRG462). In 2019, Vihalemm’s 1981 philosophically informed history of chemistry was translated from Estonian and published as a special summer issue of Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum (Vihalemm, 2019).

In this article, I present my view that only through value conflicts can we become aware of the relevant values influencing science. The discussion about values in science has been ongoing for the past decades; unfortunately, a crucial part of the discussion—value awareness—has not been addressed. This article tries to bridge this gap by focusing on the problem of value recognition through analyzing several cases of value conflicts. I will show that unless some value conflict occurs, the values influencing science (...) remain invisible to us. This means that to discuss the relevant influences of values in science, we need to focus on value conflicts occurring in science. Only then can we recognize the values influencing science and have a meaningful debate about them. This article is the first foray into the issue of value recognition and can help clarify some unaddressed issues in the values in science debate. (shrink)