Edward Jonathan Lowe was one of the most distinguished metaphysicians of the last fifty plus years. He made immense contributions to analytic philosophy in as diverse areas as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophical logic, modern philosophy (especially on John Locke) and philosophy of religion. Lowe was a realist metaphysician. Like Aristotle, he thought that, with sustained reflection and responsible engagement with empirical research, the nature of a mind independent reality can be discovered. In all of his works, (...) Lowe consistently maintained that our common-sense pre-philosophical convictions about reality should not be ignored unless there is a good reason to do so. Even in such cases, Lowe firmly believed that common-sense should rather be corrected and further enriched in light of relevant empirical discoveries. But Lowe never accepted the idea that, given the advancement of science, somehow, we should entirely stop our reliance on common-sense in our inquiry into the nature of reality. Partly in defence of this very view, Lowe developed his most influential and highly original work: the Four-Category Ontology (2006). The gist of this work concerns metaphysics as an inquiry into the structure of ultimate reality (taken in general), provides a foundation for natural science. -/- Lowe’s views on ontological issues also have direct implications for issues in philosophical theology as well as philosophy of religion such as incarnation, trinity, divine attributes, divine action, the existence of God and divine temporality or atemporality. One of the things that makes Lowe’s work uniquely suitable to apply to various issues in either philosophical theology or philosophy of religion has to do with its systematic nature. Lowe built an extremely sophisticated ontological system as shown in his the Four-Category Ontology. In so many ways, Lowe’s highly original ontological system will prove relevant to address questions that arise in philosophical theology. Many contemporary metaphysicians influenced by Lowe's system also have an interest both in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion and have integrated elements of Lowe’s metaphysics in their treatment of these questions. Yet, to this date, no attempt has been made to take a general look at how Lowe’s metaphysics relates to various issues in philosophical theology/the philosophy of religion. This is the first attempt to take concrete steps to fill in the existing gap in this regard. To this effect, this volume will deal with different aspect of Lowe’s metaphysics in relation to issues in philosophical theology. (shrink)

The essays in this volume focus on the notion of the first-person pro-noun ‘I’, the notion of the self or person,1 and the notion of the first-person perspective. Let us call these the three notions. Ever since Descartes set the initial tone in his Meditations, modern philosophical controversies concerning the three notions have continued unabated. Part of the reason for ongoing debates has to do with the sorts of questions that the three notions give rise to.

In this paper, I will give a three-stage analysis of the origin of phenomenal consciousness. The first one has to do with a non-causal stage. The second one has to do with a causal stage. The third one has to do with a correlation stage. This paper is divided into three sections. In section I, I will discuss a non-causal stage which focuses on finite consciousness as an irreducible emergent property—i.e., a simple non-structural property that is unique to the “emergent” (...) level of reality. I will examine currently dominant accounts of the emergence of phenomenal consciousness—which require consciousness to have some sort of causal link to its base level. Those who think of the emergence of consciousness in casual terms, often have in mind, brain complexity as a source of such causality. However, the causal proposal faces two serious empirically supported objections, namely: the gametes problem and the complexity problem, respectively. The first objection deals with conception (i.e., fertilization) and the impossibility of tracking down/spotting the origin of consciousness at any point during the process of the development of a foetus. The second objection focuses on demonstrating that, no amount of analysis of the physical basis of complex brain will unfold anything substantial about the origin of consciousness. Both of these two objections show why the diachronic account of the origin of the phenomenal consciousness is hard to come by. In section II, I will discuss a causal stage which focuses on, how once it emerges, consciousness enters into the domain of causal interaction with brain states. This is the stage where we come across both ‘the explanatory gap problem’ and ‘the hard problem of consciousness.’ In section III, I will discuss the correlation stage which focuses on the manner in which phenomenal consciousness continues to co-exist with its physical base (e.g., brain). To show this, I will discuss the notion of correlation and its relation to causation. The upshot of my discussion in the above three sections will constitute the view I call the non-causal spontaneous emergence of phenomenal consciousness. According to the view I am proposing, there is no causal-link between strongly emergent property (in this case, consciousness) and its base level—although the base level (as far as we know) serves as a sufficient condition (but not as a necessary condition) for its emergence. In light of this, I conclude this paper by claiming that phenomenal consciousness is a strongly emergent property. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to critically examine the objections of John Locke’s contemporaries against the theory of substance or substratum. Locke argues in Essay that substratum is the bearer of the properties of a particular substance. Locke also claims that we have no knowledge of substratum. But Locke’s claim about our ignorance as to what substratum is, is contentious. That is, if we don’t know what substratum is, then what is the point of proposing it as a bearer (...) of properties? This question underlies the criticism Locke’s contemporaries raise against the notion of substratum. In section I, I lay out the context for Locke’s theory of substratum by pointing out his main motivation in proposing his theory. In section II, I give a brief analysis of the theory of substratum. In section III, I discuss the objections of Locke’s contemporaries against the theory of substratum.1 I focus on Edward Stillingfleet, Lee Henry, G. W. Leibniz and John Sergeant. In section IV, I conclude that there is no warrant to dismiss Locke’s theory of substance. (shrink)

The essays in this special issue focus on connecting the relevant aspects of Lowe’s metaphysics to issues in philosophical theology. In this regard, the essays focus on Trinity, divine causal agency, atonement, embodied existence, physicalism vs. dualism, natural science, and theological claims.

In this paper, my main goal is to discuss two incompatible answers proposed to what I shall call, the objectivity seeking question (OSQ). The first answer is what I shall call the primacy thesis, according to which the third-person perspective is superior to that of the first-person perspective. Ultimately I will reject this answer. The second answer is what I shall call the skepticism thesis, according to which the distinction between the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective can be maintained (...) without reducing to/explaining away the former in terms of the latter. This is the answer I will defend albeit with some qualification. In this case, I will advance my discussion by appealing to the metaphysics of conscious experience/phenomenal consciousness. Third and finally, I will consider some empirically motivated objections against the skepticism thesis. In this case, my focus will be on modern neuroimaging techniques such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG), and positron emission tomography (PET) and see whether or not they pose a serious threat against the skepticism thesis. My overall conclusion will be that science and subjectivity, which is rooted in the first-person perspective, can coexist in the sense of complementing each other. (shrink)

This book aims to show the centrality of a proper ontology of properties in thinking about consciousness. Philosophers have long grappled with what is now known as the hard problem of consciousness, i.e., how can subjective or qualitative features of our experience—such as how a strawberry tastes—arise from brain states? More recently, philosophers have incorporated what seems like promising empirical research from neuroscience and cognitive psychology in an attempt to bridge the gap between measurable mental states on the one hand, (...) and phenomenal qualities on the other. In Consciousness and the Ontology of Properties, many of the leading philosophers working on this issue, as well as a few emerging scholars, have written 14 new essays on this problem. The essays address topics as diverse as substance dualism, mental causation, the metaphysics of artificial intelligence, the logic of conceivability, constitution, extended minds, the emergence of consciousness, and neuroscience and the unity and neural correlates of consciousness, but are nonetheless unified in a collective objective: the need for a proper ontology of properties to understand the hard problem of consciousness, both on non-empirical and empirical grounds. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe argues in Personal Agency that the self is physically embodied yet not identical with any physical body, nor with any part of a physical body, such as the brain. For Lowe, the self is an agent that is capable of carrying out intentional actions. Call this the thesis about the self (TS). In this paper my purpose is to develop and defend TS and argue that Frank Jackson’s serious metaphysics (SM) fails to account for the nature of (...) the self. This paper is outlined as follows: Section I presents Lowe’s theory of the self. In section II, I present Jackson’s central claims of SM. In section III, I develop Jackson’s SM as an objection against Lowe’s TS. In section IV, I respond to objections raised against Lowe’s TS and then critique Jackson’s claim that if an entity is not locatable within the framework of physicalism it should be eliminated. In section V, I conclude that Lowe’s TS is superior to Jackson’s SM. (shrink)

E. J. Lowe argues in Personal Agency that the self is physically embodied yet not identical with any physical body, nor with any part of a physical body, such as the brain. For Lowe, the self is an agent that is capable of carrying out intentional actions. Call this the thesis about the self (TS). In this paper my purpose is to develop and defend TS and argue that Frank Jackson’s serious metaphysics (SM) fails to account for the nature of (...) the self. This paper is outlined as follows: Section I presents Lowe’s theory of the self. In section II, I present Jackson’s central claims of SM. In section III, I develop Jackson’s SM as an objection against Lowe’s TS. In section IV, I respond to objections raised against Lowe’s TS and then critique Jackson’s claim that if an entity is not locatable within the framework of physicalism it should be eliminated. In section V, I conclude that Lowe’s TS is superior to Jackson’s SM. (shrink)

In this chapter, I aim to examine the two central properties that are said to underlie the theory of mirror neurons, namely action execution and action observation. I shall call these the functional properties of mirror neurons. I will argue that attributing the functional properties of mirror cognition, as many neuroscientists do, to the so-called ‘mirror neurons’ suffers from the problem of misidentification. This is the problem of incorrectly identifying an object or a property of one sort with some other (...) object or property. In light of this, I will propose that the most promising solution for the problem of misidentification is to ground the functional properties of mirror neurons squarely in consciousness and its bearer. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to discuss E. J. Lowe's view of the synergy between metaphysics and natural science. In doing so, I will extend Lowe’s synergistic model to develop a realist account of theological claims thereby responding to Byrne’s strong form of eliminativism and agnosticism about theological claims. The paper is divided up as follows. In section 1, I will discuss Lowe’s view of metaphysics. In section 2, I will explain how Lowe thinks metaphysics and natural science are related. (...) In section 3, I will respond to objections against Lowe’s conception of metaphysics. In section 4, I will discuss the implications of Lowe’s conception of metaphysics for a realist account of theological claims. In section 5, I will conclude this paper by claiming that there are excellent reasons to extend the synergy between metaphysics and natural science to that of theology as well. (shrink)

This paper examines certain influential contemporary philosophical analyses of the notion of a person and show why they are misguided. Inspired by the Lockean conception of a person, some philosophers claim that personhood must be attributed only to those human beings who can meet certain criteria required for it. Here the views of Tooley, Dennett and Singer will be discussed against the backdrop of the metaphysics of powers ontology as advocated by contemporary philosophers: C. B. Martin, John Heil and others.

This book presents engaging and informative analysis of three interrelated notions, namely: selfhood, the first person pronoun ‘I’ and the first person perspective. Philosophers have long debated about these notions on non-empirical grounds often focusing on the question of whether the first person pronoun ‘I’, beyond its role as a grammatical term, has an underlying implication for the ontology of selfhood. Philosophers continuously grapple with whether the first person pronoun ‘I’ is a referring expression and if it is, what its (...) referent is or could be. To give an adequate treatment of such questions, philosophers have begun working across the relevant disciplines. This book highlights some excellent examples of the complex nature of the first person thoughts as they figure in linguistics, autism, thought insertion in schizophrenia and the phenomenon of mental autonomy. In Selfhood, Autism and Thought Insertion, many of the leading philosophers working on this issue, as well as a few emerging scholars, have written 12 new essays addressing questions besetting the ontology of selfhood. The essays address topics as diverse as reflections on E. J. Lowe’s non-Cartesian substance dualism, physical determinism, the metaphysics and anti-metaphysics of the self, animalism, neo-Lockean persons, rationality and the first-person, whether the first person is essentially a linguistic concept, first-person and third-person perspectives and autism, consciousness, first person perspective and neuroimaging, thought insertion and mental autonomy. The contributors to this volume do not agree in all of the details associated with the notion of selfhood, yet they all have a common conviction that the central questions besetting it must be taken seriously. (shrink)

This volume attempts to show why ontology matters for a proper grasp of issues in bioethics. -/- Contemporary discussions on bioethics often focus on seeking solutions for a wide range of issues that revolve around persons. The issues in question are multi-layered, involving such diverse aspects as the metaphysical/ontological, personal, medical, moral, legal, cultural, social, political, religious, and environmental. In navigating through such a complex web of issues, it has been said that the central problems philosophers and bioethicists face are (...) ethical in nature. In this regard, biomedical sciences and technological breakthroughs take a leading role in terms of shaping the sorts of questions that give rise to ethical problems. For example, is it ethical to keep terminally ill patients alive on dialysis machines or artificial ventilators? Is it ethical to take someone’s vital organs upon death and transplant them into another person’s body without any prior consent from a deceased person? Reproductive techniques also raise complicated ethical issues involving in vitro fertilization, contraceptives, prenatal testing, abortions, and genetic enhancements. Moreover, biomedical issues raise ethical problems in regards to research on human subjects, stem cell research, and enhancement biotechnology. The beginning and end of life issues bring up their own complicated ethical conundrums involving, among other things, terminating life support and euthanasia. -/- This book approaches such complex bioethical questions by engaging in ground-level debates about the ontology of persons. This is a non-negotiable first step in taking steps forward in seeking a plausible solution(s) for the complex ethical problems in bioethics. Although the contributors in this book advance their arguments in their own ways, they all agree on one crucial methodological point: the importance of taking the ontology of persons for bioethics seriously. This is the spirit that brings the contributors of this book together as they seek to build their case(s) concerning the nature of persons. (shrink)

In what follows, I will respond to three interrelated but distinct questions which collectively focus on whether the soul exerts causal influences upon the physical states or activities of the brain. Here are the three questions: -/- 1. If the soul is constantly acting upon the brain, then why don't we see physically uncaused spikes in the energy level of the brain? 2. Are the neurons in the brain sufficiently sensitive to respond to such tiny stimuli as would be within (...) the range of energy fluctuations permitted by the Uncertainty Principle? Is the brain responsive to quantum stimuli? 3. Would it be possible to show that the soul can affect the brain without our observing mysterious energy variations? (shrink)

The Chalcedonian Definition states that the incarnate Christ is both fully human and fully divine. But spelling out what the Chalcedonian Definition entails continues to be a subject of intense controversy among philosophers and theologians alike. One of these controversies concerns what I call the problem of the bearer question. At the heart of this question lies whether or not the two natures of Christ require two distinct bearers. In section I, I will explain the problem of the bearer question (...) and how it arises directly due to the Chalcedonian Definition. In section II, I will propose a solution to the problem of the bearer question within the framework of what I call, a ‘Multi–Track Disposition Model of the Incarnation’. At the heart of this model lies the notion that the manifestation of properties is multi–directional in the sense that there is a reciprocal partnership among property manifestations. In section III, I will contrast the solution proposed to the bearer question by the Multi–Track Model to that of a ‘Kenotic Model of the Incarnation’. I will argue that the Multi–Track Model provides us with better conceptual resources to make sense of the bearer question. Finally, in section IV, I will briefly point out why ultimately a conclusive answer to the bearer question may still prove to be elusive because the bearer question gives rise to a host of other unresolved questions. (shrink)

Neural correlates of consciousness (for brevity NCC) are foundational to the scientific study of consciousness. Chalmers (2000) has provided the most informative and influential definition of NCC, according to which neural correlates are minimally sufficient for consciousness. However, the sense of sufficiency needs further clarification since there are several relevant senses with different entailments. In section one of this article, we give an overview of the desiderata for a good definition of NCC and Chalmers’s definition. The second section analyses the (...) merit of understanding the sufficiency of neural correlates for corresponding consciousness according to three relevant types of sufficiency: logical, metaphysical, and physical. In section three, a theoretical approach to consciousness studies is suggested in light of the sense in which NCC are sufficient for consciousness. Section four addresses a concern some might have about this approach. By the end, it will become apparent that our conception of NCC has important implications for research methodology, neuroethics, and the vitality of the search for NCC. (shrink)

Edited by Georg Gasser and Matthias Stefan. Cambridge University Press, 2012.

The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy. Edited by Gabriele Galluzzo and Michael J. Loux.

This book aims to show why a proper ontology of persons has paramount importance for our understanding of the nature of consciousness and its relation to the phenomenon of unconsciousness and artificial intelligence. Contemporary discussions on consciousness often focus on seeking solutions for a wide range of issues that revolve around questions related to what sort of role the brain plays in the existence of consciousness. These questions raise multi-layered and diverse metaphysical (especially, ontological), personal, medical, moral, and legal issues. (...) In navigating through such a complex web of issues, it has been said that the central problems philosophers and scientists face are establishing the nature and origin of consciousness. For example, is consciousness nothing but a brain process? If not, how is it related to brain activities? Can consciousness exist without depending on the brain and its activities? What are the neural correlates of consciousness, unconsciousness, and persons? Can we make an advance on the science of consciousness by investigating what happens to the brain during general anesthesia? Is there a relation between consciousness and unconsciousness? What is the bearer of consciousness and unconsciousness? Can consciousness exist without being someone’s consciousness? Is consciousness reproducible in computers or digital machines? If consciousness is not in all things, then what conditions must be satisfied for its emergence? Is it ethical to take someone’s vital organs without any prior consent from a person in an irreversible comatose state? The beginning and end of life issues also bring up their own complicated ethical conundrums involving consciousness. (shrink)

Cuckoldry is an adaptive problem faced by parentally investing males of socially monogamous species (e.g., humans and many avian species). Mate guarding and frequent in-pair copulation (IPC) may have evolved as anti-cuckoldry tactics in avian species and in humans. In some avian species, the tactics are used concurrently, with the result that mate guarding behaviors and IPC frequency are correlated positively. In other avian species, the tactics are compensatory, with the result that mate guarding behaviors and IPC frequency are correlated (...) negatively. The relationship between mate guarding and IPC frequency in humans is unknown. Avian males that use these tactics concurrently share with human males an inability to guard a female partner continuously during her peak fertile period. We hypothesized, therefore, that men’s mate guarding and IPC frequency function as concurrent anti-cuckoldry tactics, resulting in a positive correlation between them. Study 1 (n=305) secured men’s self-reports of mate guarding and IPC frequency. Study 2 (n+367) secured women’s reports of their partners’ mate guarding and IPC frequency. The concurrent tactics hypothesis was supported in both studies: Men’s mate guarding and IPC frequency are correlated positively, and this association is not attributable to male age, female age, relationship satisfaction, relationship length, or time that the couple spends together. The Discussion section addresses potential limitations of this research and future research directions. (shrink)

The Byzantine dreambook known in the tradition as The Oneirocriticon of Achmet has had a long and influential history both in its field and in scholarship. It is the longest of the eight surviving Byzantine books on dream interpretation, and most likely also the oldest. It was compiled during the Macedonian renaissance—specifically, the two termini of 843 and 1075 can be established—possibly in the reign of Leo VI (r. 886–912), to whom it may have been dedicated, and possibly through the (...) influence of his Arab minister Samonas. It was translated early into Latin, in 1176 (by contrast, the famous ancient dreambook of Artemidorus was not translated until 1539), and “through this translation found its way into several European and vernacular languages from the late thirteenth century onward” (p. 4). The scholarly study of the work began in 1577, with the preface Johann Loewenklau wrote for his Latin translation of the Greek text, and continued apace to this day. The book by Maria Mavroudi under review here, from which this information is taken (chapter 1), is the latest in a long series of studies. It is also the most exhaustive and meticulous in its research and the first fully to take into account, in a professional and exemplary manner, the Arabic sources of the work. Exhaustive, but perhaps also exhausting—one may object that 471 pages of text (exclusive of prefatory material and bibliographies and indices) for a study of a mere dreambook may be too many, though apparently necessary, for Mavroudi's book contends against the weight of previous scholarship and offers much needed correctives. (shrink)

Priyanshu Prabal Upadhyaya, b. 1919, Sanskrit scholar; contributed articles on various aspects of Indic philosophy, Vedic and Sanskrit literature.

This practical and essential text, co-authored by an engineer and an ethicist, covers ethical dilemmas that any engineer might encounter on the job, emphasizing the responsibility of a practicing engineer to act in an ethical manner. To illustrate the complexities involved, the authors present characters who encounter situations that test the engineering code of ethics. The dialogue between the characters highlights different perspectives of each dilemma. As they proceed through the book, students see how the code of ethics can help (...) in decision making, as well as the implications of various decisions. The philosophical theory that supports the ethical situations encountered is presented as boxed material following each section. Important Notice: Media content referenced within the product description or the product text may not be available in the ebook version. (shrink)

Do the ethical features of an artwork bear on its aesthetic value? This movie endorses misogyny, that song is a civil rights anthem, the clay constituting this statue was extracted with underpaid labor—are facts like these the proper bases for aesthetic evaluation? I argue that this debate has suffered from a false presupposition: that if the answer is yes (for at least some such ethical features), such considerations feature as pro tanto contributions to an artwork's overall aesthetic value, i.e., as (...) merits or flaws which make something have more or less overall aesthetic value. As the case of ethically laden, aesthetic evaluation makes clear, however, good aesthetic judgement is irreducibly multi-dimensional, e.g., "the movie has an engaging soundtrack, tasteful camera work, and takes a misogynistically prurient perspective on its female lead.'' Such a "non-summative" judgement refuses to reduce those various dimensions of aesthetic value to a single aggregate aesthetic evaluation, like "it's a 6/10" or "it's a pretty good movie!" I defend both the modest claim that such non-summative evaluations are not mistaken and the extremist claim that summative (i.e., unidimensional) aesthetic evaluation is defective by considering other domains of normative assessment in which summing seems inappropriate, notably including evaluations of people's character. (shrink)

Through close study of Avicenna's statements and major works, Dimitri Gutas traces Avicenna's own sense of his place in the Aristotelian tradition and the history of philosophy in Islam, and provides an introduction to reading his philosophical works by delineating the approach most consistent with Avicenna's intention and purpose in philosophy. The second edition of this foundational work, which has quickened fruitful research into the philosopher in the last quarter century, is completely revised and updated, and adds a new final (...) chapter summarizing Avicenna's philosophical project. It is also enlarged with the addition of a new appendix which offers a critical inventory of Avicenna's authentic works, updating the work of Mahdavi (1954) with additional information on all manuscripts and important editions and translations. Its usefulness enhanced, the book provides primary orientation to Avicenna's philosophy and works and constitutes an indispensable research tool for their study. (shrink)

The article compares the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change in terms of natural characteristics of the crisis triggers as well as of socio-political responses.