Philosophia Christi 13 (1):35-58 (2011)

Abstract
E. J. Lowe argues in Personal Agency that the self is physically embodied yet not identical with any physical body, nor with any part of a physical body, such as the brain. For Lowe, the self is an agent that is capable of carrying out intentional actions. Call this the thesis about the self. In this paper my purpose is to develop and defend TS and argue that Frank Jackson’s serious metaphysics fails to account for the nature of the self. This paper is outlined as follows: Section I presents Lowe’s theory of the self. In section II, I present Jackson’s central claims of SM. In section III, I develop Jackson’s SM as an objection against Lowe’s TS. In section IV, I respond to objections raised against Lowe’s TS and then critique Jackson’s claim that if an entity is not locatable within the framework of physicalism it should be eliminated. In section V, I conclude that Lowe’s TS is superior to Jackson’s SM.
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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DOI 10.5840/pc20111314
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