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  1. Meaning, prototypes and the future of cognitive science.Jaap van Brakel - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (3):233-57.
    In this paper I evaluate the soundness of the prototype paradigm, in particular its basic assumption that there are pan-human psychological essences or core meanings that refer to basic-level natural kinds, explaining why, on the whole, human communication and learning are successful. Instead I argue that there are no particular pan-human basic elements for thought, meaning and cognition, neither prototypes, nor otherwise. To illuminate my view I draw on examples from anthropology. More generally I argue that the prototype paradigm exemplifies (...)
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  • Interpreting self-ascriptions.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):393-395.
  • Two kinds of representational functionalism: Defusing the combinatorial explosion.Joel Pust - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):392-393.
    Alvin Goldman (1993) presents three arguments against the psychological plausibility of representational functionalism (RF) as a theory of how subjects self-ascribe mental predicates. Goldman appears to construe RF as an account of attitude type self-ascription. His “combinatorial explosion” argument, however, proves devastating only to an implausible construal of RF as an account of attitude content self-ascription.
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  • Speaking of beliefs: Reporting or constituting mental entities?Werner Greve & Axel Buchner - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):391-392.
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  • How to understand beliefs.Alison Gopnik - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):398-400.
  • Epistemology, two types of functionalism, and first-person authority.Alvin I. Goldman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):395-398.
    My target article did not attribute a pervasive ontological significance to phenomenology, so it escapes Bogdan's “epistemological illusion.” Pust correctly pinpoints an ambiguity between content-inclusive and content-exclusive forms of folk functionalism. Contrary to Fodor, however, only the former is plausible, and hence my third argument against functionalism remains a threat. Van Brakel's charity approach to first-person authority cannot deal with authority vis-a-vis sensations, and it has some extremely odd consequences.
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  • Meaning, prototypes and the future of cognitive science.J. Brakel - 1991 - Minds and Machines 1 (3):233-257.
    In this paper I evaluate the soundness of the prototype paradigm, in particular its basic assumption that there are pan-human psychological essences or core meanings that refer to basic-level natural kinds, explaining why, on the whole, human communication and learning are successful. Instead I argue that there are no particular pan-human basic elements for thought, meaning and cognition, neither prototypes, nor otherwise. To illuminate my view I draw on examples from anthropology. More generally I argue that the prototype paradigm exemplifies (...)
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  • The epistemological illusion.Radu J. Bogdan - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):390-391.