Defending the Tracking Theories of Knowledge

The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:3-8 (2007)
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Since Kripke's attack on Nozick's Tracking Theory of knowledge, there has been strong suspicion that tracking theories are false. We think that neither Kripke's arguments and examples nor other recent attacks in the literature show that the tracking theories are false. We cannot address all of these concerns here, but we will show why some of the most discussed examples from Kripke do not demonstrate that the tracking theories are false.



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Fred Adams
University of Delaware

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