Contrastive Self‐Attribution of Belief

Social Epistemology 20 (1):93 – 103 (2006)
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Abstract

A common argument for evidentialism is that the norms of assertion, specifically those bearing on warrant and assertability, regulate belief. On this assertoric model of belief, a constitutive condition for belief is that the believing subject take her belief to be supported by sufficient evidence. An equally common source of resistance to these arguments is the plausibility of cases in which a speaker, despite the fact that she lacks warrant to assert that p, nevertheless attributes to herself the belief that p. In the following, I will outline a variety of ways a speaker may contrastively attribute a belief to herself. In light of what these contrastive statements communicate, cases of attributing beliefs with little or no warrant to oneself offer no substantive counter-example to the evidentialist argument from assertion

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Scott Aikin
Vanderbilt University

Citations of this work

Contrastive Self-knowledge.Sarah Sawyer - 2014 - Social Epistemology 28 (2):139-152.
Epistemic Akrasia.Brian Ribeiro - 2011 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.
The Rhetorical Theory of Argument is Self-Defeating.Scott F. Aikin - 2011 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 3 (1).

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References found in this work

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Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action.David M. Rasmussen - 1993 - Philosophical Quarterly 43 (173):571.

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