Epistemic situationism: An Extended Prolepsis

In Mark Alfano & Abrol Fairweather (eds.), Epistemic Situationism. Oxford University Press (2017)
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Abstract

This paper is an extended prolepsis in favor of epistemic situationism, the thesis that epistemic virtues are not sufficiently widely distributed for a virtue-theoretic constraint on knowledge to apply without leading to skepticism. It deals with four objections to epistemic situation: 1) that virtuous dispositions are not required for knowledge, 2) that the Big Five or Big Six personality model proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, 3) that the cognitive-affective personality system framework proves that intellectual virtues are a reasonable ideal, and 4) that weakening the reliability requirement through epistemic dependence or abilism means that common inferential strategies really are virtues. The paper concludes with reflections on the replication crisis in psychological science.

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Mark Alfano
Macquarie University

Citations of this work

Charging Others With Epistemic Vice.Ian James Kidd - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):181-197.
Epistemic Situationism.Mark Alfano & Abrol Fairweather (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Becoming less unreasonable: A reply to Sherman.Mark Alfano - 2015 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (7):59-62.

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