Inquiry 52 (3):293-305 (2009)
This paper explores the question whether whatever is done intentionally is done for a reason. Apart from helping us to think about those concepts, the question is interesting because it affords an opportunity to identify a number of misconceptions about reasons. In the paper I argue that there are things that are done intentionally but not done for a reason. I examine two different kinds of example: things done “because one wants to” and “purely expressive actions”. Concerning the first, I argue that the tendency to think that things done because one wants to are things done for a reason derives from conflating the reason that explains why someone did something with their reason for doing it. While these sometimes coincide, they need not always do so. And although the fact that someone wanted to do something can contribute to explaining the person's action, it is not normally that person's reason for doing that thing. Purely expressive actions also provide examples of things done intentionally but not for a reason. I argue that, although those actions are spontaneous, they are nonetheless intentional and that, since they are mere expressions of emotions, they are not done for reasons - although there are reasons why we do them
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action.Joseph Raz - 1999 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Actions, Thought-Experiments and the 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities'.Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):61 – 81.
Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality.Michael Smith - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):93–109.
Reasons and the Ambiguity of 'Belief'.Maria Alvarez - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):53 – 65.
Citations of this work BETA
The Space of Motivations.Donnchadh O.’Conaill - 2014 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (3):440-455.
Commonsense Psychology, Dual Visual Streams, and the Individuation of Action.Thor Grünbaum - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):25 - 47.
Similar books and articles
Side-Effect Actions, Acting for a Reason, and Acting Intentionally.John Michael McGuire - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):317 - 333.
Self-Knowledge and the First Person.Cynthia Macdonald - 2004 - In M. Sie, Marc Slors & B. Van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Ashgate.
Self-Knowledge and the First Person.Cynthia Macdonald - 2004 - In M. Sie, M. Slors & B. Van den Brink (eds.), Reasons of One's Own. Ashgate.
Mental Causation: Compulsion by Reason.Bill Brewer - 1995 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (69):237-253.
Reasons : Explanatory and Normative.Joseph Raz - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Reasons for Action.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.
Acting Intentionally and Acting for a Reason.Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):119-122.
Taking Something as a Reason for Action.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (2):267-304.
Hegel's Social Theory of Agency : The 'Inner-Outer' Problem.Robert Pippin - 2010 - In Arto Laitinen & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Hegel on Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 3-50.
Can One Act for a Reason Without Acting Intentionally?Joshua Knobe & Sean D. Kelly - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 169--183.
Acting for Reasons: Reply to Dancy. [REVIEW]John Hyman - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):358-368.
Added to index2010-08-26
Total downloads179 ( #24,189 of 2,152,226 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #39,787 of 2,152,226 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.