Authors
Rani Anjum
University of Tromsø (PhD)
Abstract
Grice argues that indicative conditionals ‘if p then q’ have conventional, truth conditional meaning according to the material conditional ‘p  q’. In order to explain away the known paradoxes with this interpretation, he distinguishes between truth conditions and assertion conditions, attempting to demonstrate that the assumed connection between ‘p’ and ‘q’ (the Indirectness Condition) is a conversational implicature; hence a matter only relevant for the assertion conditions of a conditional. This paper argues that Grice fails to demonstrate i) that the Indirectness Condition is cancellable, hence a conversational implicature, ii) that the Indirectness Condition is not part of the conventional, truth-relevant meaning of ‘if’, and accordingly, iii) semantic or logical equivalence between indicative and material conditionals.
Keywords Paul Grice  Conditionals  Implicatures
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.Paul Grice - 1989 - Synthese 84 (1):153-161.
Conversational Impliciture.Kent Bach - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):124-162.
Implicature, Explicature, and Truth-Theoretic Semantics.Robyn Carston - 2013 - In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics–Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp. 261.
The Pragmatics of What is Said.François Recanati - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (4):295-329.

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