Belief

[author unknown]
In P. M. S. Hacker (ed.), The Intellectual Powers. Wiley. pp. 196-237 (2013)
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Abstract

It is reasonable to believe what is adequately, even though not conclusively, supported by reasons, and it is reasonable to withhold belief from something one knows lacks adequate support. Belief is equally interwoven with the concept of knowledge. Recognizing that believing is not an act one performs leaves the idea of bearing responsibility for belief in the dark. It has become common over the last few decades to take it for granted that beliefs are mental states or states of mind. It is true that one may feel convinced that things are so. But a feeling of conviction is no more a mental state than is believing. Like belief, it lacks genuine duration — for one does not cease to be or feel convinced when one falls asleep, nor can one’s conviction be interrupted by distraction of attention.

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