Abstract

Brandom, in his recent Spirit of Trust, develops a novel reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as a theory of objective idealism. In this paper, I aim to defend this interesting blend of concept realism and idealism against some potential objections by revising Brandom’s account of conceptuality based on Hegel’s logical concept of life as constitutive of objective determinations. In the first section, I briefly reconstruct the main tenets of Brandom’s objective idealism and recount its achievements. In the second section, I point out some major potential issues. First, Brandom’s commitment to a semantic holism in the context of scientific laws is likely to have reductionist or scientifically untenable implications. Second, Brandom seems to ignore Hegel’s own definition of objective idealism based on the concept of life – the culmination of his theory of conceptuality in his logic. I claim that Hegel not only has a strong emergentist commitment to the concept of life, but also argues that life is the ground of logical determinations. The last section suggests that a revision of Brandom’s framework based on a constitutive category of life can solve the problems outlined in section two.