There is Still a Problem of Consistent Incompatibility: a Response to Coren

Acta Analytica 36 (3):475-477 (2021)
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Abstract

This article responds to Daniel Coren’s very insightful critical discussion of Baumann. It clarifies and defends the view that there is a problem of mutually consistent but necessarily incompatible desires. Distinguishing explicitly between semantic and syntactic consistency, one can show that the problem remains under each interpretation of “consistent.”

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2021-01-12

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Peter Baumann
Swarthmore College

Citations of this work

Consistent desires and climate change.Daniel Coren - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):241-255.

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References found in this work

Necessarily Incompatible Consistent Wants.Peter Baumann - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (4):489-490.

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