Instantiation as Partial Identity: Replies to Critics [Book Review]

Axiomathes 23 (2):291-299 (2013)
Abstract
One of the advantages of my account in the essay “Instantiation as Partial Identity” was capturing the contingency of instantiation—something David Armstrong gave up in his experiment with a similar view. What made the contingency possible for me was my own non-standard account of identity, complete with the apparatus of counts and aspects. The need remains to lift some obscurity from the account in order to display its virtues to greater advantage. To that end, I propose to respond to those who have grappled with it in print. There are various criticisms by commentators: that it is rendered absurd by the transitivity of identity, that it makes instantiation necessary instead of contingent, that it is unclear what counts are, that aspects are simply tropes, that my view does not capture multiple location, that I make an unclear reference to a theory of composition as identity, that the account suffers from problems with polyadicity, and that it is not a realist account of universals after all. I give responses to these objections
Keywords Instantiation  Exemplification  Partial identity  Universals  Particulars  Metaphysics  David Armstrong  Aspects  Counts  Identity  Leibniz’s law
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DOI 10.1007/s10516-013-9212-9
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References found in this work BETA
Truth and Truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - Cambridge University Press.
Parts of Classes.David Lewis - 1991 - Blackwell.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume - 1739/2000 - Oxford University Press.
Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):51-91.
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.John Locke - 1689 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Instance Is the Converse of Aspect.Boris Hennig - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):3-20.

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