Authors
Boris Hennig
Ryerson University
Abstract
According to the aspect theory of instantiation, a particular A instantiates a universal B if and only if an aspect of A is cross-count identical with an aspect of B. This involves the assumption that both particulars and universals have aspects, and that aspects can mediate between different ways of counting things. I will ask what is new about this account of instantiation and, more importantly, whether it is an improvement on its older relatives. It will turn out that the part of it that is new is the notion of cross-count identity among aspects. As I will show, this notion is both dubious and unnecessary. I will end by presenting a simplified aspect theory of instantiation that does not involve cross-count identity
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Reprint years 2015
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2014.962552
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The Identity of Indiscernibles.Max Black - 1952 - Mind 61 (242):153-164.
Many-One Identity.Donald L. M. Baxter - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (3):193-216.
Four Disputes About Properties.David M. Armstrong - 2005 - Synthese 144 (3):309-320.

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