A modal bundle theory

Metaphysica 7 (2) (2006)
Authors
Jiri Benovsky
University of Fribourg
Abstract
If ordinary particulars are bundles of properties, and if properties are said to be universals, then three well-known objections arise : no particular can change, all particulars have all of their properties essentially (even the most insignificant ones), and there cannot be two numerically distinct but qualitatively indiscernible particulars. In this paper, I try to make a little headway on these issues and see how the objections can be met, if one accepts a certain view about persistence through time and across possible worlds – namely, four-dimensionalism and its modal analogue. The paper is especially devoted to the second and third of the three objections.
Keywords universals  bundle theory  identity of indiscernibles  four-dimensionalism  perdurantism
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