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407 found
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1 — 50 / 407
  1. added 2020-05-05
    Mereological Endurantism Defined.Damiano Costa - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    I develop a definition of mereological endurantism which overcomes objections that have been proposed in the literature and thereby avoids the charge of obscurity put forward by Sider against the view.
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  2. added 2020-04-13
    Why the Social Sciences Are Irreducible.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):4961-4987.
    It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token–token identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of “lower-level” individuals, but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type–type identities between social and individualistic properties are ruled out. In this paper I argue that the multiple realizability argument for explanatory (...)
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  3. added 2020-03-11
    Four-Dimensionalism and the Puzzles of Coincidence.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3. Clarendon Press.
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  4. added 2020-03-06
    Plain Paritculars.Ernani Magalhaes - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92:87-108.
    Are concrete objects in some sense made up of the properties they exemplify? A distinguished tradition holds they are. I begin by defending the distinction: there is a real and not just semantic distinction between asserting and denying that concrete objects have their properties as parts. I then argue in favor of the view that concrete objects are not made up of their parts. First, this view has less ontological baggage than its opponent. Next, the supposed advantages of the alternative (...)
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  5. added 2020-02-24
    A Mereologia Temporal Como Uma Questão de Fundamentação.Matheus Diesel Werberich - 2018 - Caderno de Resumos da IX Jornada de Pesquisa Na Pós-Graduação Em Filosofia da UFSM.
    É uma prática comum na metafísica contemporânea qualificar a discussão entre o tridimensionalismo e o quadridimensionalismo como uma questão acerca da existência de partes temporais. Enquanto que o tridimensionalismo não permite que as partes temporais existam, de tal forma que os objetos seriam totalmente presentes em todos os tempos nos quais eles existem, o quadridimensionalismo requer que esses objetos tenham partes temporais. Essa maneira de caracterizar o debate parte do ponto de vista da metaontologia quineana, segundo a qual as questões (...)
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  6. added 2020-02-12
    The Multi-Location Trilemma.Damiano Costa & Claudio Calosi - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-17.
    The possibility of multilocation --- of one entity having more than one exact location --- is required by several metaphysical theories such as the immanentist theory of universals and three-dimensionalism about persistence. One of the most pressing challenges for multi-location theorists is that of making sense of exact location --- in that extant definitions of exact location entail a principle called Functionality, according to which nothing can have more than one exact location. Recently in a number of promising papers, Antony (...)
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  7. added 2020-01-25
    Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism.Fabio Patrone - 2020 - Metaphysica (1):99-113.
    Pixelism is the combination of three metaphysical thesis, namely a radical form of exdurantism, mereological nihilism and counterpart theory. Pixelism is a theory that evaluates all the metaphysical phenomena of persistence, composition and modality in a homogeneous and consistent manner. In a pixel world, there is no identity over time and over possible worlds and nothing persists over more than an instant or a world. Entities can be univocally identified by a five-coordinates system (the three spatial dimensions, the temporal one (...)
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  8. added 2019-12-23
    How Groups Persist.August Faller - forthcoming - Synthese:1-15.
    How do groups of people persist through time? Groups can change their members, locations, and structure. In this paper, I present puzzles of persistence applied to social groups. I first argue that four-dimensional theories better explain the context sensitivity of how groups persist. I then exploit two unique features of the social to argue for the stage theory of group persistence in particular. First, fusion and fission cases actually happen to social groups, and so cannot be marginalized as “pathological.” Second, (...)
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  9. added 2019-11-15
    How to Endure Presentism.Sam Baron - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (6):659-673.
    ABSTRACTPresentism and endurantism are natural bedfellows: arguments have been mounted from endurantism to presentism and vice versa. I generalise an argument against the compatibility between presentism and endurantism offered recently by Tallant. I then show how to reformulate endurantism so that it is compatible with presentism. I demonstrate that this reformulated version of endurantism can do the same work with respect to the problem of temporary intrinsics as can standard definitions.
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  10. added 2019-10-17
    Self-Colocation: A Colocation Puzzle for Endurantists.Justin Mooney - forthcoming - Synthese.
    The recent literature on the nature of persistence features a handful of imaginative cases in which an object seems to colocate with itself. So far, discussion of these cases has focused primarily on how they defy the standard endurantist approaches to the problem of temporary intrinsics. But in this article, I set that issue aside and argue that cases of apparent self-colocation also pose another problem for the endurantist. While the perdurantist seems to have a fairly straightforward account of self-colocation, (...)
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  11. added 2019-08-29
    Perdurantism, Fecklessness and the Veil of Ignorance.Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-12.
    There has been a growing charge that perdurantism—with its bloated ontology of very person-like objects that coincide persons—implies the repugnant conclusion that we are morally obliged to be feckless. I argue that this charge critically overlooks the epistemic situation—what I call the ‘veil of ignorance’—that perdurantists find themselves in. Though the veil of ignorance still requires an alteration of our commonsense understanding of the demands on action, I argue for two conclusions. The first is that the alteration that is required (...)
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  12. added 2019-08-29
    Non-Concrete Parts of Material Objects.Michael Longenecker - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):5091-5111.
    This article offers a novel solution to the problem of material constitution: by including non-concrete objects among the parts of material objects, we can avoid having a statue and its constituent piece of clay composed of all the same proper parts. Non-concrete objects—objects that aren’t concrete, but possibly are—have been used in defense of the claim that everything necessarily exists. But the account offered shows that non-concreta are independently useful in other domains as well. The resulting view falls under a (...)
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  13. added 2019-07-25
    Purgatory, Hypertime, and Temporal Experience.Jonathan Curtis Rutledge - 2018 - Journal of Analytic Theology 6:151-161.
    Recently, JT Turner has argued that proponents of temporally-extended models of purgatory are committed to denying the doctrine of the parousia. Such persons typically argue that temporally-extended models of purgatory are needed to prevent the possibility that a morally imperfect human might become morally perfect too abruptly. In this article, I argue that Turner is mistaken and that by invoking hypertime and a clarification of the sort of abruptness at issue, temps can affirm both purgatory and the doctrine of the (...)
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  14. added 2019-07-10
    Was Bonaventure a Four-Dimensionalist?Damiano Costa - 2020 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 28 (2):393-404.
    Bonaventure is sometimes taken to be an ante litteram champion of the four-dimensional theory of persistence. I argue that this interpretation is incorrect: Bonaventure was no four-dimensionalist.
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  15. added 2019-06-07
    Sur l’« argument du vague » en faveur du quadri-dimensionnalisme: Étude critique de Sider, Theodore, Four-Dimensionalism. An Ontology of Persistence and Time, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2003, 255 pages. [REVIEW]Fabrice Correia - 2004 - Philosophiques 31 (1):239-249.
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  16. added 2019-06-06
    Familiar Objects and Their Shadows. By Crawford L. Elder. (Cambridge UP, 2011. Pp. Xi + 210. Price £50.00, $85.00 H/B.).Nathan Wildman - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):195-197.
  17. added 2019-06-06
    Modes of Extension: Comments on Kit Fine's ‘In Defence of Three-Dimensionalism’: Peter Simons.Peter Simons - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:17-21.
    The debate between 3- and 4-dimensionalists is one of the most lively and pervasive in current metaphysics. At stake is a glittering prize: the correct metaphysical analysis of material things and other objects commonly thought to persist in time by enduring. Since we count ourselves among such objects the outcome of the debate is of more than merely academic interest to us. Obviously the ramifications of the debate, even of the points raised by Kit Fine, go far beyond what I (...)
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  18. added 2019-06-06
    The A‐Theory of Time, The B‐Theory of Time, and ‘Taking Tense Seriously’.Dean W. Zimmerman - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):401-457.
    The paper has two parts: First, I describe a relatively popular thesis in the philosophy of propositional attitudes, worthy of the name ‘taking tense seriously’; and I distinguish it from a family of views in the metaphysics of time, namely, the A‐theories. Once the distinction is in focus, a skeptical worry arises. Some A‐theorists maintain that the difference between past, present, and future, is to be drawn in terms of what exists: growing‐block theorists eschew ontological commitment to future entities; presentists, (...)
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  19. added 2019-06-06
    Comments on Varzi.Fabrice Correia - 2005 - Dialectica 59 (4):499-502.
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  20. added 2019-06-06
    Modal Realism with Overlap.Kris McDaniel - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):137.
    In this paper, I formulate, elucidate, and defend a version of modal realism with overlap, the view that objects are literally present at more than one possible world. The version that I defend has several interesting features: it is committed to an ontological distinction between regions of spacetime and material objects; it is committed to compositional pluralism, which is the doctrine that there is more than one fundamental part-whole relation; and it is the modal analogue of endurantism, which is the (...)
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  21. added 2019-06-06
    Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time.Peter van Inwagen - 2000 - The Monist 83 (3):437-459.
    1. Many philosophers think that “What is identity across time?” is an important and meaningful question. I have a great deal of trouble seeing what this question might be. But, very often, if one cannot understand a philosophical question, one’s best course is to look at some alleged answers to it; sometimes these answers enable one to see what question it is that they are offered as answers to. The following passage by Michael Tooley is supposed to provide an answer (...)
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  22. added 2019-05-30
    There is No Invariant, Four-Dimensional Stuff.Hans Halvorson - manuscript
    Some philosophers say that in special relativity, four-dimensional stuff is invariant in some sense that three-dimensional stuff is not. I show that this claim is false.
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  23. added 2019-01-31
    Yuri Balashov - Persistence and Spacetime.Lorenzo Del Savio - 2018 - Humana Mente 4 (13).
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  24. added 2018-11-04
    L'identità diacronica fra ontologia e metafisica.Francesco Franda - 2014 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia Analitica Junior 2 (5):66-81.
    In this paper, I tackle the problem of diachronic identity. Far from providing a criterion for identity over time, the aim of this work is to understand if this issue pertains to ontology, conceived as that part of philosophy that tries to answer the question about what entities exist, and metaphysics, conceived as that part of philosophy that tries to explain, of those entities, what they are. On the face of it, only metaphysics has the task to solve this problem, (...)
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  25. added 2018-09-07
    Non‐Mereological Universalism.Kristie Miller - 2006 - European Journal of Philosophy 14 (3):404-422.
    In this paper I develop a version of universalism that is non-mereological. Broadly speaking, non-mereological universalism is the thesis that for any arbitrary set of objects and times, there is a persisting object which, at each of those times, will be constituted by those of the objects that exist at that time. I consider two general versions of non-mereological universalism, one which takes basic simples to be enduring objects, and the other which takes simples to be instantaneous objects. This yields (...)
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  26. added 2018-08-26
    Trouble Up at T’Ontological Mill: An Inconclusive Dialog.Peter Simons - 2017 - Cosmos + Taxis 4 (4):64-66.
    Grenon and Smith (2004) propose a framework for the ontology of things in space and time involving and invoking the distinction between continuants and occurrents, which has become a key element of Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). The terminology of SNAP (from “snapshot:” state of a continuant at a time) and SPAN (how an occurrent develops over an interval or timespan) occurs in that paper’s title. While any commonsense ontology will have a place for both continuants and occurrents, there is much (...)
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  27. added 2018-08-03
    Éléments et parties des systèmes: Note sur l'interprétation temporelle des deux relations.Daniel Schulthess - 1991 - Dialectica 45 (2‐3):181-189.
    The part‐whole and element‐system relations are usually not given a temporal interpretation. Taking a thesis of Father Bochenski as a starting point , the author first gives an adequate temporal interpretation of this thesis. Then, he shows that a divergence arises, in non‐static systems, between the system itself and the mereological sum corresponding to it at a certain instant. Therefore, any reductionism has to confront the generally neglected problem of this divergence. Résumé Les relations partie‐tout et élément‐système ne sont pas (...)
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  28. added 2018-05-18
    Balashov on Special Relativity, Coexistence, and Temporal Parts.Cody S. Gilmore - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (3):241-263.
    Yuri Balashov has argued that endurantism is untenable in the context of Minkowski spacetime. Balashov's argument runs through two main theses concerning the relation of coexistence, or temporal co-location. Coexistence must turn out to be an absolute or objective matter; and in Minkowski spacetime coexistence must be grounded in the relation of spacelike separation. If endurantism is true, then leads to absurd conclusions; but if perdurantism is true, then is harmless. I object to both theses. Against, I argue that coexistence (...)
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  29. added 2018-03-05
    Are We Causally Redundant?Jiri Benovsky - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-8.
    Some friends of eliminativism about ordinary material objects such as tables or statues think that we need to make exceptions. In this article, I am interested in Trenton Merricks’ claim that we need to make an exception for us, conscious beings, and that we are something over and above simples arranged in suitable ways, unlike tables or statues. I resist this need for making an exception, using the resources of four-dimensionalism.
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  30. added 2018-02-17
    Endurantism and Timeless Worlds.N. Effingham & J. Melia - 2007 - Analysis 67 (2):140-147.
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  31. added 2018-02-17
    Perdurance and Psychological Continuity.Trenton Merricks - 2000 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):195-198.
    If persons endure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. That is one conclusion defended in my "Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity". Rea and Silver claim that my argument for that conclusion is sound only if a parallel argument is sound. The parallel argument concludes that if persons perdure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. In this paper, I show that Rea and Silver are mistaken. My argument is sound (...)
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  32. added 2018-02-16
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 5.Dean Zimmerman (ed.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this series is a much-needed focus for it. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides (...)
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  33. added 2018-02-16
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 3.Dean Zimmerman (ed.) - 2007 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is the forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character: this new series is a much-needed focus for it. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. (...)
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  34. added 2018-02-02
    Storrs McCall's Tree of The Universe and Counterfactuals شجرة الكون وقضايا مناقضة الواقع عند ستورس مكال.Salah Osman - 1999 - Journal of the Faculty of Arts, Menoufia University 2956-2090 39:83 – 128.
    لم يكن العلم يومًا غريبًا عن الفلسفة، بل لقد أدت العلاقة الجدلية المستمرة بينهما إلى مزيد من المصداقية والقبول لبعض النماذج التفسيرية، سواء منها ما كان في الأصل نموذجًا فلسفيًا ثم وجد دعمًا علميًا – كنموذج الذرات والفـراغ عند «ديمرقــريطس» وتبنى النظرية الذرية الحديثة لإطاره العام – أو ما كان منها نموذجًا علميًا تم تداوله فلسفيًا – كنموذج النقاط المادية المتجاذبة عند »نيوتن« وتبنى معظم فلاسفة الحقبة الحديثة له. وفي هذا المقال يهتم الدكتور صلاح عثمان بمناقشة نموذج شجرة الكون لفيلسوف (...)
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  35. added 2017-12-09
    Formal Ontologies of Space and Time. IFOMIS Report.Thomas Bittner & Barry Smith - 2003 - In IFOMIS Report.
    We propose an ontological theory that is powerful enough to describe both complex spatio-temporal processes (occurrents) and the enduring entities (continuants) that participate in such processes. For this purpose we distinguish between meta-ontology and token ontologies. Token ontologies fall into two major categories: ontologies of type SPAN and ontologies of type SNAP. These represent two complementary perspectives on reality and result in distinct though compatible systems of categories. The meta-ontological level then describes the relationships between the different token ontologies. In (...)
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  36. added 2017-11-29
    3D Cohabitation.Simon Langford - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1195-1210.
    The cohabitation theory is a popular solution to the problem of personal fission. It affirms that all the people who result from fission were there cohabiting the pre-fission body all along. Adopting this solution is an uncontroversial move for four-dimensionalists, but is it open to three-dimensionalists too? Some have thought so, but Katherine Hawley, Mark Johnston, and Eric Olson have argued to the contrary. They claim three-dimensionalists simply cannot be cohabitation theorists. In this paper, I explain how they can.
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  37. added 2017-06-14
    Enduring Through Gunk.Matt Leonard - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):753-771.
    According to one of the more popular endurantist packages on the market, a package I will call multilocational endurantism, enduring objects are exactly located at multiple instantaneous regions of spacetime. However, for all we know, the world might turn out to be spatiotemporally gunky and spatiotemporal gunk entails that this package is false. The goal of this paper is to sketch a view which retains the spirit of multilocational endurantism while also recognizing the possibility of certain types of objects which (...)
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  38. added 2017-04-04
    Names Introduced with the Help of Unsatisfied Sortal Predicates.Tobias Hansson Wahlberg - 2010 - Axiomathes 20 (4):511-514.
    In this paper I answer Aranyosi’s (Axiomathes 19(2):223–224, 2009) criticism of my “Is Phosphorus Hesperus?” (Axiomathes 19(1):101–102, 2009).
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  39. added 2017-03-13
    Parfitians as Exdurantists.Fabio Patrone - 2017 - Axiomathes (6):1-9.
    Derek Parfit’s thesis that identity doesn’t matter in survival has been extensively discussed except for its metaphysical robustness. How can we justify the abandonment of identity in the way Parfit suggests? My argument is the following. Those who want to endorse the thesis that identity doesn’t matter (and, therefore, abandon identity across time) should adopt exdurantism, i.e. a metaphysics according to which the world is composed by temporal parts each existing at a time and according to which there is nothing (...)
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  40. added 2017-03-13
    Is Time Travel a Problem for the Three-Dimensionalist?Jonathan Simon - 2005 - The Monist 88 (3):353-361.
    Theodore Sider has recently produced an argument which he takes to show that three-dimensionalism is incompatible with the possibility of time travel. I wish to argue that there is indeed a problem for the three-dimensionalist who wishes to countenance time travel, but that Sider has misdiagnosed it. I show why his putative challenge fails, and furthermore that if it were to succeed this would be as problematic for a wide class of four-dimensionalist positions, including Sider’s own, as it would be (...)
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  41. added 2017-03-06
    The Limit Decision Problem and Four-Dimensionalism.Costa Damiano - 2017 - Vivarium 55 (1-3):199-216.
    I argue that medieval solutions to the limit decision problem imply four-dimensionalism, i.e. the view according to which substances that persist through time are extended through time as well as through space, and have different temporal parts at different times.
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  42. added 2017-03-04
    Ought a Four-Dimensionalist To Believe in Temporal Parts?Kristie Miller - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):619-646.
    This paper presents the strongest version of a non-perdurantist four-dimensionalism: a theory according to which persisting objects are four-dimensionally extended in space-time, but not in virtue of having maximal temporal parts. The aims of considering such a view are twofold. First, to evaluate whether such an account could provide a plausible middle ground between the two main competitor accounts of persistence: three-dimensionalism and perdurantist four-dimensionalism. Second, to see what light such a theory sheds on the debate between these two competitor (...)
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  43. added 2017-03-04
    Issues in Theoretical Diversity: Persistence, Composition, and Time.Kristie Miller - 2006 - Springer.
    Our world is full of composite objects that persist through time: dogs, persons, chairs and rocks. But in virtue of what do a bunch of little objects get to compose some bigger object, and how does that bigger object persist through time? This book aims to answer these questions, but it does so by looking at accounts of composition and persistence through a new methodological lens. It asks the question: what does it take for two theories to be genuinely different, (...)
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  44. added 2017-02-15
    On What We Are and How We Persist.Simon Langford - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):356-371.
    This article defends novel approaches to what we are and how we persist. First it is claimed that we have disjunctive persistence conditions: we can persist by way of either biological continuity or psychological continuity. Then it is claimed that we are neither human beings nor persons essentially. Rather, we are essentially bio-psycho-continuers, a concept to be explained along the way. A variety of objections are considered and found wanting.
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  45. added 2017-02-13
    Re-Animating the Place of Thought: Transformations of Spatial and Temporal Description in the Twenty-First Century.Nigel Thrift - 2008 - In Ash Amin & Joanne Roberts (eds.), Community, Economic Creativity, and Organization. Oxford University Press. pp. 90--119.
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  46. added 2017-02-13
    All the Law's a Stage.Milner S. Ball - 1999 - Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 11 (2):215-221.
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  47. added 2017-02-11
    Protosyntax: A Thetic (Unaccusative) Stage?Eugenia Casielles & Ljiljana Progovac - forthcoming - Theoria Et Historia Scientiarum 9:29-48.
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  48. added 2017-02-09
    The Time of the Self.Dan Zahavi - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):143-159.
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  49. added 2017-02-08
    The Paradox of Fission and the Ontology of Ordinary Objects.Thomas Sattig - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):594-623.
    What happens to a person in a case of fission? Does it survive? Does it go out of existence? Or is the outcome indeterminate? Since each description of fission based on the persistence conditions associated with our ordinary concept of a person seems to clash with one or more platitudes of common sense about the spatiotemporal profile of macroscopic objects, fission threatens the common-sense conception of persons with inconsistency. Standard responses to this paradox agree that the common-sense conception of persons (...)
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  50. added 2017-02-08
    It Simply Does Not Add Up: Trouble with Overall Similarity.Michael Morreau - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (9):469-490.
    Comparative overall similarity lies at the basis of a lot of recent metaphysics and epistemology. It is a poor foundation. Overall similarity is supposed to be an aggregate of similarities and differences in various respects. But there is no good way of combining them all.
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