About this topic
Summary

The bundle theory construes objects as collections of properties (tropes or universals) tied together by a bundling relation, often called "compresence". It opposes to the substratum theory, the view that objects are substrates instantiating properties or having modes. One can distinguish between two interesting debates.

First, it can be disputed which of the two views should be preferred. A classical objection against the bundle theory is the objection from change advocated by Van Cleve. He argues that a bundle cannot change its members without becoming another bundle, and thus, another individual. Another interesting problem has to do with the bundling relation: what is it? Is it a primitive sui generis relation, or can it be identified with another relation, already present in one's ontology? 
Key works Van Cleve put forward his objection in Van Cleve 1985. Possible answers to the first question include a perdurantist strategy: see Benovsky 2008. But, one can also argue that the bundle theory and the substrate theory are metaphysically equivalent, see Benovsky 2008. Regarding the second problem, O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover (O'Leary-Hawthorne & Cover 1998) substitute to the bundling relation an ontology of state of affairs, the connection of properties being then assured not by the existence of a bundling relation but by the unity of the state of affairs. Alternatively, L.A. Paul (2002, 2006, forthcoming) argues that the bundling relation should be identified to a restrictivist relation of composition. 
Related categories

105 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 105
  1. Lowe’s Eliminativism About Relations and the Analysis of Relational Inherence.Markku Keinänen - forthcoming - In Jonathan Lowe and Ontology.
    Contrary to widely shared opinion in analytic metaphysics, E.J. Lowe argues against the existence of relations in his posthumously published paper There are probably no relations (2016). In this article, I assess Lowe’s eliminativist strategy, which aims to show that all contingent “relational facts” have a monadic foundation in modes characterizing objects. Second, I present two difficult ontological problems supporting eliminativism about relations. Against eliminativism, metaphysicians of science have argued that relations might well be needed in the best a posteriori (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The Concreteness of Objects: An Argument Against Mereological Bundle Theory.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    In a series of publications, L. A. Paul has defended a version of the bundle theory according to which material objects are nothing but mereological sums of ‘their’ properties. This ‘mereological’ bundle theory improves in important ways on earlier bundle theories, but here I present a new argument against it. The argument is roughly this: 1) Material objects occupy space; 2) even if properties have spatial characteristics, they do not quite occupy space; 3) on no plausible construal of mereological composition (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Les théories méréologiques du faisceau.Baptiste Le Bihan - forthcoming - In Métaphysique et ontologie. Paris: Vrin.
    « Pourquoi les choses tiennent-elles ensemble ? » (Traité d'ontologie, 2009, p. 237). Cette citation me sert de départ à une réflexion sur la nature des relations liantes souvent appelées relations de comprésence à la suite de Russell, ces bundling relations qui nouent les propriétés ensembles pour constituer les objets ordinaires (tables, chaises, individus biologiques) selon la théorie du faisceau. De même que Frédéric Nef, je suis séduit par les nombreuses vertus philosophiques de ces relations liantes. Ma contribution ne portera (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Mereological Bundle Theory.L. A. Paul - forthcoming - In Hans Burkhardt, Johanna Seibt & Guido Imaguire (eds.), Handbook of Mereology. Philosophia Verlag.
    Bundle theory takes objects to be bundles of properties. Some bundle theorists take objects to be bundles of instantiated universals, and some take objects to be bundles of tropes. Tropes are instances of properties: some take instantiated universals to be tropes, while others deny the existence of universals and take tropes to be ontologically fundamental. Historically, the bundling relation has been taken to be a primitive relation, not analyzable in terms of or ontologically reducible to some other relation, and has (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  5. The World Just Is the Way It Is.David Builes - 2021 - The Monist 104 (1):1-27.
    What is the relationship between objects and properties? According to a standard view, there are primitive individuals that ‘instantiate’ or ‘have’ various properties. According to a rival view, objects are mere ‘bundles’ of properties. While there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of primitive individuals, there are also a number of challenges that the bundle theorist faces. The goal of this paper is to formulate a view about the relationship between objects and properties that avoids many of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. A Platonic Trope Bundle Theory.Christopher Buckels - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy Today 2 (2):91-112.
    This paper provides a rational reconstruction of a Platonic trope bundle theory that is a live alternative to contemporary bundle theories. According to the theory, Platonic particulars are composed of what Plato calls images of Forms; contemporary metaphysicians call these tropes. Tropes are dependent on Forms and the Receptacle, while trope bundles are structured by natural kinds using the Phaedo's principles of inclusion and exclusion and the Timaeus’ geometrised elements, as well as by co-location in the Receptacle. Key elements of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Abstracta and Abstraction in Trope Theory.A. R. J. Fisher - 2020 - Philosophical Papers 49 (1):41-67.
    Trope theory is a leading metaphysical theory in analytic ontology. One of its classic statements is found in the work of Donald C. Williams who argued that tropes qua abstract particulars are the very alphabet of being. The concept of an abstract particular has been repeatedly attacked in the literature. Opponents and proponents of trope theory alike have levelled their criticisms at the abstractness of tropes and the associated act of abstraction. In this paper I defend the concept of a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. Strong Pluralism, Coincident Objects and Haecceitism.Karol Lenart & Artur Szachniewicz - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (4):347-370.
    According to strong pluralism, objects distinct by virtue of their modal properties can coincide. The most common objection towards such view invokes the so-called Grounding Problem according to which the strong pluralist needs to explain what the grounds are for supposed modal differences between the coincidents. As recognized in the literature, the failure to provide an answer to the Grounding Problem critically undermines the plausibility of strong pluralism. Moreover, there are strong reasons to believe that strong pluralists cannot provide an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Do We See Facts?Alfredo Vernazzani - 2020 - Mind and Language.
    Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Bundle Theory with Kinds.Markku Keinänen & Tuomas E. Tahko - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):838-857.
    Is it possible to get by with just one ontological category? We evaluate L.A. Paul's attempt to do so: the mereological bundle theory. The upshot is that Paul's attempt to construct a one category ontology may be challenged with some of her own arguments. In the positive part of the paper we outline a two category ontology with property universals and kind universals. We will also examine Paul's arguments against a version of universal bundle theory that takes spatiotemporal co-location instead (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  11. Introverted Metaphysics: How We Get Our Grip on the Ultimate Nature of Objects, Properties, and Causation.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):688-707.
    This paper pulls together three debates fundamental in metaphysics and proposes a novel unified approach to them. The three debates are (i) between bundle theory and substrate theory about the nature of objects, (ii) dispositionalism and categoricalism about the nature of properties, and (iii) regularity theory and production theory about the nature of causation. The first part of the paper (§§2-4) suggests that although these debates are metaphysical, the considerations motivating the competing approaches in each debate tend to be epistemological. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. A Bundle Theory of Words.J. T. M. Miller - 2019 - Synthese:1-18.
    It has been a common assumption that words are substances that instantiate or have properties. In this paper, I question the assumption that our ontology of words requires posting substances by outlining a bundle theory of words, wherein words are bundles of various sorts of properties (such as semantic, phonetic, orthographic, and grammatical properties). I argue that this view can better account for certain phenomena than substance theories, is ontologically more parsimonious, and coheres with claims in linguistics.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  13. Bundle Theory and the Identity of Indiscernibles.Philip Swenson & Bradley Rettler - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):495-508.
    A and B continue their conversation concerning the Identity of Indiscernibles. Both are aware of recent critiques of the principle that haven’t received replies; B summarizes those critiques, and A offers the replies that are due. B then raises a new worry.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Material Objects and Essential Bundle Theory.Stephen Barker & Mark Jago - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):2969-2986.
    In this paper we present a new metaphysical theory of material objects. On our theory, objects are bundles of property instances, where those properties give the nature or essence of that object. We call the theory essential bundle theory. Property possession is not analysed as bundle-membership, as in traditional bundle theories, since accidental properties are not included in the object’s bundle. We have a different story to tell about accidental property possession. This move reaps many benefits. Essential bundle theory delivers (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  15. The Repeatability Argument and the Non-Extensional Bundle Theory.Matteo Benocci - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (3):432-446.
    ABSTRACTI present a new objection to Bundle Theory. The objection rests on the repeatability of universals, and targets every version of Bundle Theory that assumes that concrete particulars constituted by the same universals are numerically identical. The only way that bundle theorists can elude this objection is to admit the possibility of distinct bundles constituted by the same universals. If even this view is untenable, then Bundle Theory as such is hopeless. Finally, I show how the present inquiry reshapes the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  16. What Are Tropes, Fundamentally? A Formal Ontological Account.Jani Hakkarainen - 2018 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 94:129-159.
    In this paper, I elaborate on the Strong Nuclear Theory (SNT) of tropes and substances, which I have defended elsewhere, using my metatheory about formal ontology and especially fundamental ontological form. According to my metatheory, for an entity to have an ontological form is for it to be a relatum of a formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order. The full fundamental ontological form is generically identical to a simple formal ontological relation or relations jointly in an order. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Essential Bundle Theory and Modality.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 6):1-16.
    Bundle theories identify material objects with bundles of properties. On the traditional approach, these are the properties possessed by that material object. That view faces a deep problem: it seems to say that all of an object’s properties are essential to it. Essential bundle theory attempts to overcome this objection, by taking the bundle as a specification of the object’s essential properties only. In this paper, I show that essential bundle theory faces a variant of the objection. To avoid the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. A Trope Theoretical Analysis of Relational Inherence.Markku Keinänen - 2018 - In Jaakko Kuorikoski & Teemu Toppinen (eds.), Action, Value and Metaphysics - Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Finland Colloquium 2018, Acta Philosophica Fennica 94. Helsinki: Societas Philosophica Fennica. pp. 161-189.
    The trope bundle theories of objects are capable of analyzing monadic inherence (objects having tropes), which is one of their main advantage. However, the best current trope theoretical account of relational tropes, namely, the relata specific view leaves relational inherence (a relational trope relating two or more entities) primitive. This article presents the first trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence by generalizing the trope theoretical analysis of inherence to relational tropes. The analysis reduces the holding of relational inherence to the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. Do We Need Visual Subjects?Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (4):574-594.
    It is widely accepted within contemporary philosophy of perception that the content of visual states cannot be characterized simply as a list of represented features. This is because such characterization leads to the so-called, “Many Properties problem”, i.e. it does not allow us to explain how the visual system is able to distinguish between scenes containing different arrangements of the same features. The usual solution to the Many Properties problem is to characterize some elements of content as subjects, to which (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Nuclear Bundles of Tropes and Ontological Dependence.José Tomás Alvarado - 2016 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 5 (6):205--224.
    [EN] Several conceptions of trope bundles have postulated mutual relations of ontological dependence to explain the unity of the bundle. The idea is that a bundle is a plurality of tropes such that each one of them is dependent on any other. A variant of this idea is that there is a ‘nucleus’ of tropes all of them mutually dependent, and there is also a ‘periphery’ or ‘halo’ of tropes that are dependent on the tropes of the nucleus, but the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. The Ontology of the Secret Doctrine in Plato’s Theaetetus.Christopher Buckels - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (3):243-259.
    The paper offers an interpretation of a disputed portion of Plato’s Theaetetus that is often called the Secret Doctrine. It is presented as a process ontology that takes two types of processes, swift and slow motions, as fundamental building blocks for ordinary material objects. Slow motions are powers which, when realized, generate swift motions, which, in turn, are subjectively bundled to compose sensible objects and perceivers. Although the reading of the Secret Doctrine offered here—a new version of the “Causal Theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Back to Black.Claudio Calosi & Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Ratio 29 (1):1-10.
    This is a brief sequel to Max Black 's classic dialogue on the Identity of Indiscernibles. Interlocutor A defends the bundle theory by endorsing the view according to which Black 's world does not contain two indiscernible spheres but rather a single, bi-located sphere. His opponent, B, objects that A cannot distinguish such a world from a world with a single, uniquely located sphere, hence that the view in question adds nothing to A's original response to Black 's challenge. A (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  23. Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.
    According to the traditional bundle theory, particulars are bundles of compresent universals. I think we should reject the bundle theory for a variety of reasons. But I will argue for the thesis at the core of the bundle theory: that all the facts about particulars are grounded in facts about universals. I begin by showing how to meet the main objection to this thesis (which is also the main objection to the bundle theory): that it is inconsistent with the possibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  24. Mary Shepherd on Causal Necessity.Jeremy Fantl - 2016 - Metaphysica 17 (1):87-108.
    Lady Mary Shepherd’s critique of Hume’s account of causation, his worries about knowledge of matters of fact, and the contention that it is possible for the course of nature to spontaneously change relies primarily on three premises, two of which – that objects are merely bundles of qualities and that the qualities of an object are individuated by the causal powers contributed by those qualities – anticipate contemporary metaphysical views in ways that she should be getting credit for. The remaining (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  25. Tropes as Character-Grounders.Robert K. Garcia - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):499-515.
    There is a largely unrecognized ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation throws into relief two fundamentally different conceptions of a trope and provides two ways to understand and develop each metaphysical theory that put tropes to use. In this paper I consider the relative merits that result from differences concerning a trope’s ability to ground the character of ordinary objects. I argue that on each conception of a trope, there are unique implications and challenges concerning character-grounding.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  26. Essence and the Grounding Problem.Mark Jago - 2016 - In Reality Making. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-120.
    Pluralists about coincident entities say that distinct entities may be spatially coincident throughout their entire existence. The most pressing issue they face is the grounding problem. They say that coincident entities may differ in their persistence conditions and in the sortals they fall under. But how can they differ in these ways, given that they share all their microphysical properties? What grounds those differences, if not their microphysical properties? Do those differences depend only on the way we conceptualise those objects? (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  27. Les propriétés du vide et de l’espace-temps.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2016 - Philosophiques 43 (1):49-66.
    Les propriétés matérielles sont généralement appréhendées comme les propriétés d’une substance matérielle : cette chemise possède la propriété d’être bleue, cette chaussure la propriété d’être en bon état. Pourtant, on peut trouver plusieurs raisons de douter que les propriétés soient nécessairement les propriétés d’une substance matérielle, à la fois en métaphysique avec la théorie du faisceau, et en physique contemporaine à travers les notions d’énergie du vide et de champ. Or, si les propriétés ne sont pas les propriétés de substances (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Meta-Metaphysics: On Metaphysical Equivalence, Primitiveness, and Theory Choice. By Jiri Benovsky. [REVIEW]Tuomas E. Tahko - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 723.
    Review of Meta-Metaphysics: On Metaphysical Equivalence, Primitiveness, and Theory Choice (Springer, Synthese Library, 2016). By Jiri Benovsky.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. Two Ways to Particularize a Property.Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (4):635-652.
    Trope theory is an increasingly prominent contender in contemporary debates about the existence and nature of properties. But it suffers from ambiguity concerning the nature of a trope. Disambiguation reveals two fundamentally different concepts of a trope: modifier tropes and module tropes. These types of tropes are unequally suited for metaphysical work. Modifier tropes have advantages concerning powers, relations, and fundamental determinables, whereas module tropes have advantages concerning perception, causation, character-grounding, and the ontology of substance. Thus, the choice between modifier (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  30. Is Trope Theory a Divided House?Robert K. Garcia - 2015 - In Gabriele Galluzzo Michael Loux (ed.), The Problem of Universals in Contemporary Philosophy. Cambridge University Press. pp. 133-155.
    In this paper I explore Michael Loux’s important distinction between “tropes” and “tropers”. First, I argue that the distinction throws into relief an ambiguity and discrepancy in the literature, revealing two fundamentally different versions of trope theory. Second, I argue that the distinction brings into focus unique challenges facing each of the resulting trope theories, thus calling into question an alleged advantage of trope theory—that by uniquely occupying the middle ground between its rivals, trope theory is able to recover and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  31. Plain Paritculars.Ernâni Magalhães - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):87-108.
    Are concrete objects in some sense made up of the properties they exemplify? A distinguished tradition holds they are. I begin by defending the distinction: there is a real and not just semantic distinction between asserting and denying that concrete objects have their properties as parts. I then argue in favor of the view that concrete objects are not made up of their parts. First, this view has less ontological baggage than its opponent. Next, the supposed advantages of the alternative (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1).
    When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  33. I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphysica, An International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 15 (1):113-127.
    When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. The Rumble in the Bundle.Benjamin L. Curtis - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):298-313.
    In 1952, two well-known characters called ‘A’ and ‘B’ met for the first time to argue about the Identity of Indiscernibles (Black, 1952). A argued that the principle is true, and B that it is false. By all accounts A took a bit of a beating and came out worst-off. Forty-three years later John O’Leary-Hawthorne offered a response on behalf of A that looked as if it would work so long as A was willing to accept the universal-bundle theory of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  35. Bundle Theory’s Black Box: Gap Challenges for the Bundle Theory of Substance.Robert Garcia - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):115-126.
    My aim in this article is to contribute to the larger project of assessing the relative merits of different theories of substance. An important preliminary step in this project is assessing the explanatory resources of one main theory of substance, the so-called bundle theory. This article works towards such an assessment. I identify and explain three distinct explanatory challenges an adequate bundle theory must meet. Each points to a putative explanatory gap, so I call them the Gap Challenges. I consider (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  36. La caja negra de la teoría del haz: desafíos explicativos para la teoría de la sustancia como haz de propiedades.Robert García - 2014 - Quaderns de Filosofia i Ciència 1 (2):55-72.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. The Problem of Trope Individuation: A Reply to Lowe.Markku Keinänen & Jani Hakkarainen - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):65-79.
    This paper is the first trope-theoretical reply to E. J. Lowe’s serious dilemma against trope nominalism in print. The first horn of this dilemma is that if tropes are identity dependent on substances, a vicious circularity threatens trope theories because they must admit that substances are identity dependent on their constituent tropes. According to the second horn, if the trope theorist claims that tropes are identity independent, she faces two insurmountable difficulties. (1) It is hard to understand the ontological dependence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  38. A Modal Ontology of Properties for Quantum Mechanics.Newton Costa, Olimpia Lombardi & Mariano Lastiri - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3671-3693.
    Our purpose in this paper is to delineate an ontology for quantum mechanics that results adequate to the formalism of the theory. We will restrict our aim to the search of an ontology that expresses the conceptual content of the recently proposed modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, according to which the domain referred to by non-relativistic quantum mechanics is an ontology of properties. The usual strategy in the literature has been to focus on only one of the interpretive problems of the theory and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  39. A Modal Ontology of Properties for Quantum Mechanics.Newton da Costa, Olimpia Lombardi & Mariano Lastiri - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3671-3693.
    Our purpose in this paper is to delineate an ontology for quantum mechanics that results adequate to the formalism of the theory. We will restrict our aim to the search of an ontology that expresses the conceptual content of the recently proposed modal-Hamiltonian interpretation, according to which the domain referred to by non-relativistic quantum mechanics is an ontology of properties. The usual strategy in the literature has been to focus on only one of the interpretive problems of the theory and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  40. Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem.Susan Schneider - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):135-153.
    Most answers to the mind-body problem are claims about the nature of mental properties and substances. But advocates of non-reductive physicalism have generally neglected the topic of the nature of substance, quickly nodding to the view that all substances are physical, while focusing their intellectual energy on understanding how mental properties relate to physical ones. Let us call the view that all substances are physical or are exhaustively composed of physical substances substance physicalism (SP). Herein, I argue that non-reductive physicalism (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  41. No Bare Particulars.Andrew M. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (1):31-41.
    There are predicates and subjects. It is thus tempting to think that there are properties on the one hand, and things that have them on the other. I have no quarrel with this thought; it is a fine place to begin a theory of properties and property-having. But in this paper, I argue that one such theory—bare particularism—is false. I pose a dilemma. Either bare particulars instantiate the properties of their host substances or they do not. If they do not, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  42. Against Zero-Dimensional Material Objects (and Other Bare Particulars).Daniel Giberman - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):305-321.
    A modus tollens against zero-dimensional material objects is presented from the premises (i) that if there are zero-dimensional material objects then there are bare particulars, and (ii) that there are no bare particulars. The argument for the first premise proceeds by elimination. First, bare particular theory and bundle theory are motivated as the most appealing theories of property exemplification. It is then argued that the bundle theorist’s Ockhamism ought to lead her to reject spatiotemporally located zero-dimensional property instances. Finally, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  43. The Relationist and Substantivalist Theories of Time: Foes or Friends?Jiri Benovsky - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):491-506.
    Abstract: There are two traditionally rival views about the nature of time: substantivalism that takes time to be a substance that exists independently of events located in it, and relationism that takes time to be constructed out of events. In this paper, first, I want to make some progress with respect to the debate between these two views, and I do this mainly by examining the strategies they use to face the possibilities of ‘empty time’ and ‘time without change’. As (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  44. Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation.Douglas Ehring - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
    Properties and objects are everywhere, but remain a philosophical mystery. Douglas Ehring argues that the idea of tropes--properties and relations understood as particulars--provides the best foundation for a metaphysical account of properties and objects. He develops and defends a new theory of trope nominalism.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  45. Tropes – The Basic Constituents of Powerful Particulars.Markku Keinänen - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):419-450.
    This article presents a trope bundle theory of simple substances, the Strong Nuclear Theory[SNT] building on the schematic basis offered by Simons's (1994) Nuclear Theory[NT]. The SNT adopts Ellis's (2001) dispositional essentialist conception of simple substances as powerful particulars: all of their monadic properties are dispositional. Moreover, simple substances necessarily belong to some natural kind with a real essence formed by monadic properties. The SNT develops further the construction of substances the NT proposes to obtain an adequate trope bundle theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  46. Bundles, Individuation and Indiscernibility.Matteo Morganti - 2011 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):36-48.
    In a recent paper, Sun Demirli (2010) proposes an allegedly new way of conceiving of individuation in the context of the bundle theory of object constitution. He suggests that allowing for distance relations to individuate objects solves the problems with worlds containing indiscernible objects that would otherwise affect the theory. The aim of the present paper is i) To show that Demirli’s proposal falls short of achieving this goal and ii) To carry out a more general critical assessment of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. Relational and Substantival Ontologies, and the Nature and the Role of Primitives in Ontological Theories.Jiri Benovsky - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (1):101-121.
    Several metaphysical debates have typically been modeled as oppositions between a relationist approach and a substantivalist approach. Such debates include the Bundle Theory and the Substratum Theory about ordinary material objects, the Bundle (Humean) Theory and the Substance (Cartesian) Theory of the Self, and Relationism and Substantivalism about time. In all three debates, the substantivalist side typically insists that in order to provide a good treatment of the subject-matter of the theory (time, Self, material objects), it is necessary to postulate (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  48. Indiscernibility and Bundles in a Structure.Sun Demirli - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):1-18.
    The bundle theory is a theory about the internal constitution of individuals. It asserts that individuals are entirely composed of universals. Typically, bundle theorists augment their theory with a constitutional approach to individuation entailing the thesis ‘identity of constituents is a sufficient ground for numerical identity’ (CIT). But then the bundle theory runs afoul of Black’s duplication case—a world containing two indiscernible spheres. Here I propose and defend a new version of the bundle theory that denies ‘CIT’, and which instead (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  49. Trope Theory and the Bradley Regress.Anna-Sofia Maurin - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):311-326.
    Trope theory is the view that the world is a world of abstract particular qualities. But if all there is are tropes, how do we account for the truth of propositions ostensibly made true by some concrete particular? A common answer is that concrete particulars are nothing but tropes in compresence. This answer seems vulnerable to an argument (first presented by F. H. Bradley) according to which any attempt to account for the nature of relations will end up either in (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  50. The Self : A Humean Bundle and/or a Cartesian Substance ?Jiri Benovsky - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (1):7 - 19.
    Is the self a substance, as Descartes thought, or is it 'only' a bundle of perceptions, as Hume thought ? In this paper I will examine these two views, especially with respect to two central features that have played a central role in the discussion, both of which can be quickly and usefully explained if one puts them as an objection to the bundle view. First, friends of the substance view have insisted that only if one conceives of the self (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 105