The Socratic method, defeasibility, and doxastic responsibility

Educational Philosophy and Theory 50 (3):244-253 (2018)
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Abstract

There is an extensive body of philosophical, educational, and popular literature explaining Socratic pedagogy’s epistemological and educational ambitions. However, there is virtually no literature clarifying the relationship between Socratic method and doxastic responsibility. This article fills that gap in the literature by arguing that the Socratic method models many of the features of an ideally doxastically responsible agent. It ties a robust notion of doxastic responsibility to the Socratic method by showing how using defeaters to undermine participants’ knowledge claims can facilitate responsible belief. It then argues that more robust notions of doxastic responsibility can be augmented by constructs found in the American Philosophical Association’s Delphi Report. Finally, it shows how considering challenges and modifying beliefs accordingly are objectives of the Socratic method and crucial elements of what it means to be a responsible believer.

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2017-06-27

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Peter Boghossian
Portland State University

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References found in this work

Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.
The ascription of responsibility and rights.H. L. A. Hart - 1951 - In Gilbert Ryle & Antony Flew (eds.), Logic and language (first series): essays. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 171 - 194.

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