How to Understand and Solve the Lottery Paradox

Logos and Episteme 4 (3):283-292 (2013)
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It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain kinds of cases, but which still allows that belief in a conjunction on the basis of justified belief in its conjuncts can often be justified.



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Patrick Bondy
Wichita State University

Citations of this work

DeRose on Lotteries.Peter Baumann - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (1):44-67.

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References found in this work

The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.
Believing conjunctions.Simon J. Evnine - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):201-227.
``Justified Inconsistent Beliefs".Richard Foley - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):247-257.

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