Logos and Episteme 4 (3):283-292 (2013)

Authors
Patrick Bondy
Wichita State University
Abstract
It has been claimed that there is a lottery paradox for justification and an analogous paradox for knowledge, and that these two paradoxes should have a common solution. I argue that there is in fact no lottery paradox for knowledge, since that version of the paradox has a demonstrably false premise. The solution to the justification paradox is to deny closure of justification under conjunction. I present a principle which allows us to deny closure of justification under conjunction in certain kinds of cases, but which still allows that belief in a conjunction on the basis of justified belief in its conjuncts can often be justified.
Keywords Lottery paradox  Justification  Knowledge
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ISBN(s) 2069-0533
DOI 10.5840/logos-episteme20134313
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References found in this work BETA

The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.
Believing Conjunctions.Simon J. Evnine - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):201-227.
``Justified Inconsistent Beliefs".Richard Foley - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):247-257.

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