Authors
Nick Bostrom
Oxford University
Abstract
In a recent paper in this journal, Ken Olum attempts to refute the Doomsday argument by appealing to the self-indication assumption, the idea that your very existence gives you reason to think that there are many observers. In contrast to earlier refutation attempts that use this strategy, Olum confronts and try to counter some of the objections that have been made against SIA. We argue that his defense of SIA is unsuccessful. This does not, however, mean that one has to accept the Doomsday argument. A developed theory of observation selection effects shows why the Doomsday argument is inconclusive and how one can consistently reject both it and SIA.
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00298
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References found in this work BETA

The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers.Ken D. Olum - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):164-184.
Doomsday--Or: The Dangers of Statistics.Dennis Dieks - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (166):78-84.

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Citations of this work BETA

How to Predict Future Duration From Present Age.Bradley Monton & Brian Kierland - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):16-38.
The Doomsday Argument.Alasdair Richmond - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (2):129-142.
Self-Location and Causal Context.Simon Friederich - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (2):232-258.

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