What truth does the emotive-imperative answer to the open-question argument leave to moral judgments?

Journal of Value Inquiry 37 (3):341-352 (2003)
Abstract This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/B:INQU.0000013346.36601.b9
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,813
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
How to Stand Up for Non-Cognitivists.Huw Price - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292.
True or False?Peter Winch - 1988 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):265 – 276.
In Defence of the Open Question Argument.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - Journal of Ethics 8 (2):179-196.
Moral and Epistemic Open-Question Arguments.Chris Heathwood - 2009 - Philosophical Books 50 (2):83-98.
Are Moral Philosophers Moral Experts?Bernward Gesang - 2010 - Bioethics 24 (4):153-159.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
60 ( #90,785 of 2,202,772 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #150,076 of 2,202,772 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature