The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance

Synthese 167 (1):81--92 (2009)
Abstract
David Lewis’s ‘Humean Supervenience’ (henceforth ‘HS’) combines realism about laws, chances, and dispositions with a sparse ontology according to which everything supervenes on the overall spatiotemporal distribution of non-dispositional properties (Lewis 1986a, Philosophical papers: Volume II, pp. ix–xvii, New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1994, Mind 103:473–490). HS faces a serious problem—a “big bad bug” (Lewis 1986a, p. xiv): it contradicts the Principal Principle, a seemingly obvious norm of rational credence. Two authors have tried to rescue Lewis’s ontology from the ‘big bad bug’ (henceforth ‘the Bug’) by rejecting realism about laws, chances, and dispositions (Halpin 1994, Aust J Phil 72:317–338, 1998, Phil Sci 65:349–360; Ward 2005, Phil Sci 71:241–261). I will argue that this strategy cannot possibly work: it is the ontology, not the realist thesis, that lies at the root of the problem.
Keywords Metaphysics  Philosophy of science  Laws of nature  Probability  Humean Supervenience  Bayesianism  Quasi-realism  Relativism
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-007-9290-6
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,440
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.Lewis David - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Essays in Quasi-Realism.Simon Blackburn - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Humean Supervenience Debugged.David Lewis - 1994 - Mind 103 (412):473--490.
The Big Bad Bug: What Are the Humean's Chances?John Bigelow, John Collins & Robert Pargetter - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):443-462.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
New Foundations for Counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.
What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?Franz Huber - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):81-110.
Briggs on Antirealist Accounts of Scientific Law.John Halpin - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3439–3449.
Why Follow the Royal Rule?Franz Huber - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
On What We Know About Chance.Frank Arntzenius & Ned Hall - 2003 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):171-179.
Raid! Dissolving the Big, Bad Bug.Jenann Ismael - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):292–307.
The Anatomy of the Big Bad Bug.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):428-449.
The Big Bad Bug: What Are the Humean's Chances?John Bigelow, John Collins & Robert Pargetter - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):443-462.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
256 ( #13,637 of 2,180,373 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #155,584 of 2,180,373 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums