Comparing contextualism and invariantism on the correctness of contextualist intuitions

Grazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1):71-100 (2005)
Authors
Jessica Brown
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
Contextualism is motivated by cases in which the intuitive correctness of a range of phenomena, including knowledge attributions, assertions and reasoning, depends on the attributor's context. Contextualists offer a charitable understanding of these intuitions, interpreting them as reflecting the truth value of the knowledge attributions and the appropriateness of the relevant assertions and reasoning. Here, I investigate a range of different invariantist accounts and examine the extent to which they too can offer a charitable account of the contextualist data.
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DOI 10.1163/18756735-069001005
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