Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?

Philosophical Studies 162 (1):35 - 42 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I respond to three arguments aimed at establishing that natural kind properties — a kind of high-level properties — occur in the experiential content of visual perceptual experience: the argument from phenomenal difference, the argument from mandatory seeing, and the argument from associative agnosia. I conclude with a simple argument against the view that natural kind properties occur in the experiential content of visual experience.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

Rich perceptual content and aesthetic properties.Dustin Stokes - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Can we see natural kind properties?René Jagnow - 2015 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 44 (2):183-205.
Perceptual Content, Phenomenal Contrasts, and Externalism.Thomas Raleigh - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):602-627.
Perceptual Kinds as Supervening Sortals.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):174-201.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-02-09

Downloads
1,367 (#12,632)

6 months
210 (#14,384)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Berit Brogaard
University of Miami

Citations of this work

Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2019 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
Seeing and Conceptualizing: Modularity and the Shallow Contents of Perception.Eric Mandelbaum - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):267-283.
Recent Issues in High-Level Perception.Grace Helton - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):851-862.
In defense of hearing meanings.Berit Brogaard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2967-2983.

View all 60 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The representational character of experience.David Chalmers - 2004 - In Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181.
The Foundations of Two-Dimensional Semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics. New York: Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 55-140.
Two-dimensional semantics.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Ernest LePore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Which Properties Are Represented in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 481-503.
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content.Tim Bayne - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):385-404.

Add more references