The Journal of Ethics 5 (1):21-37 (2001)

Authors
Sarah Broadie
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
Though clearly fallacious, the inference from determinism to fatalism (the ``Lazy Argument'''') has appealed to such minds as Aristotle and his disciple, Alexander of Aphrodisias. It is argued here (1) that determinism does entail a rather similar position, dubbed ``futilism''''; and (2) that distinctively Aristotelian determinism entails fatalism for any event to which it applies. The concept of ``fate'''' is examined along the way.
Keywords Alexander of Aphrodisias  Aristotle  Chrysippus  determinism  fatalism  fate  futilism  hypothetical necessity  Lazy Argument  teleology
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1011466914535
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