The scope of rational requirements

Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):28-49 (2010)
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Abstract

Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are narrow-scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are wide-scope requirements. I present a new objection to the narrow-scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements which Kolodny considers. His argument for the narrow-scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption, that an attitude which puts in place a narrow-scope rational requirement somewhere thereby puts in place a narrow-scope rational requirement everywhere. My argument against Kolodny is analogous to arguments which use holism about reasons to defend moral particularism.

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John Brunero
University of Nebraska, Lincoln

Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.

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