Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239 (2011)

Authors
Jonathan Way
University of Southampton
Abstract
Some irrational states can be avoided in more than one way. For example, if you believe that you ought to A you can avoid akrasia by intending to A or by dropping the belief that you ought to A. This supports the claim that some rational requirements are wide-scope. For instance, the requirement against akrasia is a requirement to intend to A or not believe that you ought to A. But some writers object that this Wide-Scope view ignores asymmetries between the different ways of avoiding irrationality. In this paper I defend the Wide-Scope view against recent objections of this sort from Mark Schroeder and Niko Kolodny. I argue that once we are clear about what the Wide-Scope view is committed to—and, importantly, what it is not—we can see that Schroeder and Kolodny’s objections fail
Keywords Rational requirements  Asymmetry objection  Wide-scope view  Schroeder  Kolodny  Broome
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9563-7
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References found in this work BETA

The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Impartial Reason.Stephen L. Darwall - 1983 - Cornell University Press.
Normative Requirements.John Broome - 1999 - Ratio 12 (4):398–419.
Wide or Narrow Scope?John Broome - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):359-370.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
The Coherent and the Rational.Errol Lord - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):151-175.
Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Wide and Narrow Scope.Sam Shpall - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):717-736.

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